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One hundred years ago the 1918 influenza pandemic 
swept the globe, killing between 50-90 million people. 
The loss of life was so great that cities throughout the 
United States struggled to keep up with burials; it is 
estimated that 195,000 Americans died in October 1918 
alone (CDC, 2018). During the height of the outbreak, 
Chicago reported 1,200 people dying per day and 
Philadelphia had so many dead bodies they weren’t able 
to bury them in a timely manner, with some awaiting 
burial for over a week (CDC, 2018). In 2006, the last 
remaining survivor of the 1918 outbreak was asked 
about his memories of the pandemic and he recalled 
that people would become ill in the morning and be dead 
by nighttime stating, “That’s how quickly it happened. 
They disappeared from the face of the earth” (Associated 
Press, 2006).  
Since the end of the 1918 pandemic the world has faced 
three more influenza pandemics, the most recent being 
the 2009 H1N1 pandemic which infected 2 billion people 
in 6 months. Additionally, we face an ever increasing 
frequency of emerging infectious diseases with 
pandemic potential. These diseases could kill millions, 
cost billions, and have other significant economic, 
social, national security, and political consequences. 
Technological developments of the last hundred years 
have brought incredible international advancements 
and have created a more dependent and interconnected 
global economy, but these same advances that promote 
economic prosperity, also create new and unique 
challenges for pandemic preparedness and response.  
In an increasingly interconnected world the threat 
of pandemics continues to grow. It is not a matter 
of if there will be a major pandemic, but when. The 
Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs is committed 
to elevating the importance of pandemic preparedness 
and biosecurity as a national security priority, and to 
bringing attention to the challenges and gaps, as well as 
the opportunities to improve our response systems so 
INTRODUCTION
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that when the next pandemic strikes, the catastrophic 
impacts can be mitigated or reduced.
In this white paper, we address four gaps and provide 
accompanying recommendations that we believe 
must be addressed in order to increase our pandemic 
preparedness and biosecurity. These gaps and topic 
areas include: 1) Establishing greater community 
resilience; 2) Strengthening coordination and leadership 
at the federal level in the United States; 3) Changing 
the university and funding reward systems to 
encourage greater interdisciplinary research, education, 
and service; and 4) Elevating the importance and 
incentives for private sector involvement in pandemic 
preparedness and response, as well as their involvement 
in overall biosecurity. 
In addition to the topic areas, which are present in each 
annual policy white paper, we have included short inserts 
by experts in the fields of pandemic preparedness and 
biosecurity. Lastly, for the first time we have included a 
pandemic report card. This examines progress made, 
if any, on the recommendations presented in the 2018 
Scowcroft Institute White Paper. The purpose of this new 
addition is to provide an added element of accountability 
for those at the national and international level tasked 
with pandemic preparedness and response. If the United 
States and international system do not make progress 
towards closing the gaps addressed in this and previous 
Scowcroft white papers, countries will remain vulnerable 
to a devastating outbreak.     
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Historical experience with disease outbreaks, natural 
disasters, and the threat of bioterrorism reminds us of 
our shared vulnerability. This experience should remind 
policy leaders and the global health community at all 
levels that we also have a shared responsibility to take 
action. Ever evolving and virulent forms of influenza; 
recent outbreaks of Ebola; the presence of Zika in the 
Americas, India and Asia; the spread of antimicrobial 
resistant diseases, in addition to diseases with no 
vaccination or prevention options; and the threat of 
novel and emerging infectious diseases (including 
those of zoonotic origin) pose an increasing threat to 
human and animal welfare and development.  The 
shared international experience responding to these 
crises has demonstrated several important lessons 
observed for effective disease prevention and response. 
Unfortunately, there are few, sustained lessons learned.
First, effective prevention, detection, and front-line 
response to epidemics all require close participation 
and coordination of numerous people and institutions 
at the local level (McClelland, 2017). Community-based 
nurses and health workers, civil society organizations, 
veterinarians, teachers, religious leaders and traditional 
healers are often the first people to detect a novel 
disease or the first cluster of cases at the start of 
an epidemic.  National governments often face 
the challenge of delayed surveillance information, 
creating critical time delays between identifying an 
outbreak, reporting, and mobilizing a response effort 
(McClelland, 2017).  Outbreaks start at the local level, 
and community members serve as essential links to 
the health system for early detection and first response 
before external assistance arrive. Community members 
and structures are essential throughout the process, 
from being at the front-lines to recognize and report 
potential outbreaks, to rapid containment and control 
efforts, limiting geographic spread and mitigating the 
impact of outbreaks on social structures (McClelland, 
TOPIC AREA 1: ESTABLISHING HOST COUNTRY 
COMMUNITY RESILIENCE
Authors: James White & Alinda Lauer
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2017).  To date, however, national governments and 
international global health security stakeholders have 
not fully acknowledged that vulnerable communities 
face numerous and cumulative threats requiring a 
collaborative focus on working with communities to 
prepare context-specific, bottom-up, community-focused 
approaches to outbreak prevention, detection, response 
and recovery (FEMA, 2019; Zolnikov, 2018).
The second lesson is that, historically, the international 
response to epidemics and other health emergencies, 
with the notable exception of some vaccine development 
efforts, have predominantly occurred at the time of 
a crisis, not in between or in advance of outbreaks.  
While it is clear that the most effective defense against 
epidemics is an effective and high-quality national or 
provincial health system, the medical and technical 
responses to epidemics have most often come through 
external donor-driven emergency systems and global 
health security institutions – not as part of system-wide 
preparations and prevention via primary health care 
and universal health coverage efforts already underway 
in resource-poor communities.  It is increasingly clear 
that successful epidemic prevention and control 
efforts should occur before a health emergency 
occurs.  Effective response requires engaging and 
empowering a broad range of community actors and 
this empowerment is at the core of developing strong 
community-based primary healthcare systems.  Strong 
primary healthcare systems are an essential platform 
to attain universal health coverage and prepare 
communities to withstand external all-hazard public 
health threats, including high consequence infectious 
diseases.  However, to date, national public health 
systems and international health security/emergency 
response stakeholders have typically operated in 
isolation. Mobilizing both the primary healthcare and 
universal health coverage systems in harmony at the 
community level is vital to strengthening effective 
epidemic prevention, detection, and response, and it 
is critical that national and provincial governments be 
supported in this pursuit.
The last key lesson observed is that international 
responses to major epidemics have not fully taken 
into account the interaction of multiple hazards and 
vulnerabilities at the community level that contribute 
to disease outbreaks and spread. A better appreciation 
and understanding of these interactions are essential to 
determine effective prevention, detection, and response 
strategies (Aitsi-Selmi & Murray, 2016).  FEMA argues 
that, to meet this challenge, responders and external 
governments must better understand communities, 
peoples, and populations (FEMA, 2011). Even though 
FEMA guidance is primarily intended for communities 
in the United States, the guidance is generally relevant 
to communities world-wide. Understanding when and 
how communities have the means to prepare and 
respond effectively will increase disease prevention 
and containment (FEMA, 2019). The challenges of 
inadequate infrastructure, lack of personnel, and other 
compounding factors in many communities makes 
it difficult to effectively prepare for emergencies, let 
alone effectively respond and recover when outbreaks 
occur. Reports from recent international outbreaks 
demonstrate national and community-level surveillance 
systems did not function effectively; health systems, 
healthcare providers, and logistic networks were 
overwhelmed and unable to cope in identifying and 
responding to new cases; and routine primary healthcare 
and basic health services deteriorated during outbreaks 
(Kruk et al., 2017).  Effective planning and preparation 
requires linking community health information systems 
to national health information systems, establishing 
International Health Regulation (IHR) compliant reporting 
protocols, estimating financing needs, and supporting 
ongoing community health system strengthening. This 
must be done prior to an outbreak and requires an 
understanding of community resources, threats, and 
areas of vulnerability.
This section explores these key lessons in further detail 
by, first, exploring key concepts and terms such as 
‘community’, ‘preparedness’, and ‘resiliency’ focusing 
on the community’s role, followed by a discussion 
of various resiliency and community preparedness 
frameworks available in the public health literature.  We 
argue that although these frameworks have helped 
conceptualize the problem and described useful 
parameters of community resilience, there is a need to 
further explore how these frameworks and terms can 
be harmonized and made operational.   Building on 
current case experiences in the literature, we emphasize 
four broad operational goals to improve community-
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based capacities to prevent, detect, and respond to 
epidemics.  We emphasize the need for synergy between 
primary healthcare-universal health coverage and 
global health security-emergency systems, and the 
need for operational approaches that harmonizes and 
align these two systems at the community level.  We 
demonstrate the need for a systematic approach to 
defining, mapping, and mobilizing community assets 
and stakeholders and, using specific country examples, 
we argue for the involvement of “whole communities” in 
preparedness and prevention efforts before an epidemic 
occurs. Additionally, there is a need for clearly defined 
roles and resources to mobilize community actors for 
detection and response when a health emergency 
strikes. We argue working closely with communities to 
build their broad resiliency capabilities before, during, 
and after outbreaks occur is one of the single most 
pressing priorities in global health today, and essential 
for effective global health security. 
What is a resilient community?
Defining a resilient community requires identifying what 
is meant by a community along with core functions.  
Community means different things in different societies 
and to different constituencies; however, for the 
purposes of this discussion, we define a community 
to mean the collective of all people, institutions, 
structures, and social practices shared by a group at a 
country’s sub-national levels, whether county, zonal or 
district, municipal or sub-municipal.  While geography 
is a core component of defining a community, it is also 
determined by shared beliefs, culture, religion, and 
social ties.  We can further define a community by its 
leadership structures, both formal and informal, which 
define the community’s borders and political-legal 
structures.  A “whole community” in its broadest terms 
therefore also includes the full range of all public, civil 
society, non-profit, religious faith-based, private, and 
corporate actors and institutions as defined in that 
community’s space (FEMA, 2019).  
These people and sectors constitute a range of core 
community functions, services, and products across 
diverse realms such as health, water and sanitation, 
agriculture, environment, law, education, and military – 
all of which are central to effective epidemic prevention, 
detection, and response. Community educators and 
health promoters are critical in building awareness 
around disease prevention and educating community 
members before, during, and after a health threat, and 
have been essential sources of early data collection for 
disease detection.  Agricultural workers and operators at 
the local level are essential in preventing and reporting 
zoonotic disease threats; local sanitation crews and 
environmental workers are essential to promoting a 
disease-free environment; and religious and civil society 
actors are critical educating the public and promoting 
culturally appropriate responses when outbreaks occur. 
Community-based health workers, agricultural 
extension workers, religious leaders, and civil society 
organization leaders or community members are 
often the first people to detect and report a novel 
disease symptom and are critical to establishing and 
maintaining communication between the international 
health security system, the primary healthcare system, 
and an affected community during an epidemic.   It is 
most often public and private health providers at the 
community level who must serve as first responders 
to disease outbreaks, promote initial containment, 
and seek to maintain the community’s other primary 
healthcare functions during the early stages. Community 
leaders, both formal and informal, are indispensable to 
effectively translating community norms and practices to 
external responders. 
The private sector – including a broad range of health 
facilities and pharmacies, grocers, retail outlets, and 
industries – offer critical human and logistic resources 
essential to effectively preventing, detecting, and 
responding to disease threats at the community level. 
Understanding these core functions and capabilities, 
mapping the diverse roles of community actors, 
identifying and operationalizing these roles remain a key 
priority to more holistically defining communities and 
the core functions they play in disease response.
Disease outbreaks are “a serious disruption of the 
functioning of a community or a society involving 
widespread human, material, economic or environmental 
losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the 
affected community or society to cope using its own 
resources” (Olu et al., 2017).  Drawing on the lessons 
from the 2014-15 West Africa Ebola epidemic, the 
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term resilience has become increasingly central when 
discussing the overall strength of a health system and 
a community’s preparedness to prevent, detect, and 
respond to disasters such as disease outbreaks (Moon 
et al., 2015; National Academy of Medicine, 2016; UN, 
2016).  Resilient health systems and communities are 
those where “health actors, institutions, and populations 
are prepared for and can effectively respond to 
crises; maintain core functions when a crisis hits; and, 
informed by lessons learnt during the crisis, reorganize 
if conditions require it” both during or after a crisis 
(Allenby & Fink, 2005).  A resilient community is able to 
mobilize the human, financial, and logistic resources 
necessary to maintain core functions before, during, 
and after a crisis occurs – distinct but directly linked 
to the concepts of preparedness, health security, and 
health systems strengthening (Kruk, Myers, Varpilah, & 
Dahn, 2015; Kutzin & Sparkes, 2016).  Further, a concept 
of preparedness that includes an emphasis on cultural 
knowledge and resources will enhance community 
resilience to disease, because “resilience is premised 
in large part on access to strengths and familiarity that 
come from one’s own cultural system” (FEMA, 2019).  As 
outlined by FEMA, “Building a Culture of Preparedness” 
means understanding how to promote disaster 
readiness across all sectors of society, understanding 
local and community risks, building partnerships before 
disaster occurs, and recognizing the diversity inherent in 
a community (FEMA, 2019).   We will now explore various 
international frameworks that have further defined the 
concepts of resilience and disaster readiness – including 
the concept of preparedness in the context of disease 
outbreaks.
Resiliency, Outbreak Preparedness,  
and Disaster Readiness Frameworks
At the international level, the International Health 
Regulations, the Global Health Security Agenda, 
and the Joint External Evaluation process have all 
guided international collaboration on global health 
security.  Operational lessons emerging from this 
international cooperation during recent epidemics 
have highlighted that, while resources and attention 
has largely focused on international and national 
level preparedness, engaging and supporting local 
communities has been critical in disease outbreak and 
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epidemic prevention, detection, and response on the 
ground.  Recent literature has highlighted how the World 
Health Organization (WHO) and its member states are 
increasingly emphasizing ways in which pursuit of the 
Global Health Security Agenda priorities can mutually 
reinforce efforts toward universal health coverage and 
strong health systems. That success in global health 
security preparedness, however, requires embedding 
the International Health Regulations requirements into 
national health systems (Kluge et al., 2018).  Further, 
given that “a country’s ability to prevent a local disease 
outbreak from becoming an epidemic often rests with 
the level of knowledge of the situation and actions taken 
at the community level” (Armstrong-Mensah & Ndiaye, 
2018), there is a significant need to advance the Global 
Health Security Agenda’s mandate to build capacity with 
an emphasis on community engagement.  
Practically, the Joint External Evaluation process has 
provided a strong start to national level evaluation 
of global health security and International Health 
Regulations capacities and has collected significant 
information on community-level resources that will be 
useful in building community level resilience. However, 
there is a need to expand this level of detailed capacity 
assessment and preparedness planning to the local 
community-level in order to help epidemic-vulnerable 
communities effectively implement the International 
Health Regulations, global health security, and Joint 
External Evaluation mandates. In addition, several 
international frameworks have been proposed that 
highlight diverse perspectives on the components of a 
resilient, outbreak-prepared, or disaster-ready system.  
These frameworks have explored national health system 
resilience (Kruk et al., 2017; Kruk, Meyers, Varpilah, & 
Dahn, 2015), the unique aspects of disaster resilience in 
cities and urban settings (The Rockefeller Foundation, 
City Resilience Index), Disaster Risk Reduction and 
Disaster Risk Management at the regional (The African 
Union, 2004) and international (UNISDR, 2015) level, 
and community-based approaches to emergency 
management and preparedness (FEMA, 2011; FEMA 
2019). 
With so many frameworks, diverse actors, dissimilar 
terminologies and digital environments, varied 
leadership and funding streams, and competing 
COMMUNIT Y RESPONSES TO 
THE 1918 INFLUENZA PANDEMIC
As we seek to draw lessons from the 1918 pandemic 
it is worth noting that as the disease spread across 
the United States and the globe, communities of all 
types experienced and responded in many different 
ways. At the national level, the United States was 
primarily focused on keeping up public morale and 
utilized “the same strategy for communicating about 
the disease that was developed to disseminate war 
news” (Barry, 2009). As a result, at the local level, 
officials and newspapers across the country were 
silent or minimized the scale of the pandemic in 
order to reassure the public, despite the visibility 
of bodies piling up in the streets in major cities 
(Philadelphia and New York) (Barry, 2009). 
Community reactions to this were diverse.  
Numerous cities shut down essential services, 
absenteeism crippled basic services, such as 
railways, telephone exchanges were shut down, 
which cut-off communication, while grocers, 
retailers, and coal sellers also closed (Barry, 2009; 
Stern, Cetron, & Markel, 2010).  However, where 
better communication between health authorities 
and the public took place, the response to the 
pandemic substantially improved.  An analysis of 
the success of school closures across forty-three 
U.S. cities demonstrated that success hinged 
on transparent communication and clear lines 
of authority (Stern, Cetron, & Markel, 2009).  In 
San Francisco, the mayor encouraged full page 
newspaper ads declaring “wear a mask and save your 
life”, which allowed society to continue functioning, 
transport remained active, food was delivered, and 
the sick were tended to (Stern 2010). 
In 2019, as in 1918, telling the public the truth, 
communicating threats and epidemic control needs 
effectively, and encouraging society to protect 
themselves, rather than empty reassurances and 
minimization of threats, is paramount to effective 
epidemic control.
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priorities in resource-poor environments – how can 
communities use these frameworks to strengthen 
their preparedness to prevent, detect, and respond 
to disease threats?  How can global health security 
stakeholders better understand these priorities in 
the context of addressing disease outbreaks at the 
community level? Our interpretation, after reviewing 
and synthesizing various global health security-related 
priorities and frameworks, is that although each of them 
uses dissimilar terminology and conceptual guidance 
that would be difficult to articulate in a single conceptual 
vision – they all provide useful guidance on revealing 
the core competencies required in building stronger 
community epidemic resilience.   Synthesizing these 
frameworks, concepts and priorities suggests that the 
key to meeting the international and national goals for 
health system resiliency, outbreak preparedness, and 
disaster readiness lies in effectively engaging, involving, 
and mobilizing communities and ensuring they are 
empowered with contextually appropriate technical and 
financial resources to prevent, detect, and respond to 
disease threats.
Developing an Operational  
Approach to Strengthening  
Community Epidemic Resilience 
The international community, and in particular health 
security stakeholders in host countries, require a more 
direct operational approach to preparing, capacitating, 
mobilizing, and supporting communities as central 
actors in epidemic prevention, detection, and response.  
However, as outlined above, communities are diverse, 
complex, and exist in numerous cultural and geographic 
contexts.  Can an operational approach be developed 
that is equally relevant to communities in well-resourced 
and advanced development settings, in middle-income 
countries, in resource-constrained environments, and 
in fragile and frail states?  Systematic planning and 
preparedness efforts are complex even in well-resourced 
contexts, are often too intensive to appeal to some 
stakeholders, and are complicated even further in times 
of conflict, displacement, and large scale movement of 
people.  
Here we present an operational approach and priority 
goals that would, in the broadest sense, be consistent 
and of equal importance in all the environments outlined 
above.  However, we note that the levels of resourcing, 
functional capacities, availability of health personnel and 
multi-sectoral actors, and tangible community assets will 
be extremely diverse, highly variable, and contextually-
determined depending on the specific community 
setting.  
In the ideal situation, health system leadership and 
global health security stakeholders will invest in the 
first of these operational priorities (primary healthcare, 
universal health coverage, and global health security 
alignment) before and/or in-between epidemics, noting 
that starting with comprehensive and coordinated 
preparedness planning in advance of a health emergency 
is by far the most effective strategy to preventing or 
mitigating the impact of future epidemics. 
However, this is not always feasible and there are several 
countries facing current epidemic threats that first and 
foremost require urgent investment in strengthening the 
emergency detection and response capacities outlined 
in this approach. While emergency response efforts 
should always seek to focus on establishing long-term 
capabilities and infrastructure (i.e. closing the relief-
development gap), this may not be immediately possible 
in all settings.  As explored in the text-box below, for 
countries facing immediate epidemic threats there are 
urgent community engagement priorities separate from 
longer-term preparedness goals.
Operational Goal 1: To successfully align 
primary healthcare, universal health 
coverage, and global health security 
systems and their respective priorities  
at the community level.
Building community resilience requires the ability to 
concurrently develop both the foundational aspects 
of strong community health system (e.g., adequate 
human resources, sound Infection Control Protocols 
(ICP), functional supply chain, strong surveillance 
systems), while also strengthening a community’s rapid 
response capabilities in case of a crisis (e.g., emergency 
responders, personal protective equipment, vaccines) 
(Ling et al., 2017).  Here we emphasize the need to 
break down the siloes between primary healthcare 
and universal health coverage strengthening efforts 
at the community level (focused on the foundational 
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aspects of health systems that can help prepare for and 
prevent external shocks to the health system) and global 
health security/emergency response (focused on rapid 
response capabilities that seek to reinforce community 
health systems during an epidemic or other health crisis). 
A resilient community is one where both these priorities 
are efficiently integrated. It is where synergies have been 
strengthened between the primary healthcare system 
and emergency response stakeholders, and where the 
whole community (within and external to the health 
system) is involved before, during, and after a health 
emergency.
The 2014-15 West African Ebola epidemic and the current 
2018 DRC outbreak, have cast a spotlight on how the 
strength of community-level health systems can either 
prevent or facilitate a health emergency. After the first 
reported cases in Nigeria in July 2014, the government’s 
response was robust and comprehensive, demonstrating 
strong health system resilience at the state and 
community-levels that successfully contained the 
outbreak.  The Nigeria case demonstrates how outbreaks 
in resource-poor settings can be quickly contained 
“where there is commitment and determination backed 
by requisite resources, materials, and human capacity” 
(Heen, 2016).  
In Liberia’s outbreak in 2014-15, the health system 
showed early signs of resilience during and after the 
outbreak, but large gaps emerged in the ongoing 
provision of primary healthcare service delivery 
(Waganar et al., 2018).  Lack of a skilled workforce at the 
community level in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone 
led to challenges in containing the initial outbreaks 
(Shoman, Karafillakis, & Rawaf, 2017).  Throughout the 
epidemic staff turnover rates were high, which left the 
APPLYING THIS OPERATIONAL APPROACH IN AREAS  
OF ACTIVE DISEASE OUTBREAK
In partner countries facing active disease outbreaks or epidemics, immediate investments should focus on the 
following urgent priorities while still seeking to stabilize the outbreak and achieving longer term preparedness 
objectives.
Building Trust, Reducing Fear, and Fostering Collaboration
Lessons from the Ebola responses in Mali, Liberia, and now prominently in DRC, all demonstrate that distrust of 
external aid workers, fear of a very visibly deadly disease, and a lack of communication between health officials, 
aid agencies, and community members have not only inhibited the effectiveness of emergency detection and 
response but, in fact turned some communities against those trying to assist.  Most recently, in the DRC, fear 
is preventing detection and reporting efforts as families are resistant to report illnesses and death to health 
authorities.  Distrust of external aid workers and lack of effective information exchange with community members 
has led to extremely violent attacks on Ebola Treatment Centers in Katwa and Butembo, and as experienced in 
West Africa, infection control, burial issues, and failing to translate epidemic risk via cultural channels pose major 
threats to effective emergency response.
Educating, Communicating, and Mobilizing Through Cultural Channels
 As explored further under operational goal four, emergency responses must be able to quickly link with, 
communicate with, and effectively engage community leadership (formal, religious, and traditional) in order 
to enable emergency detection and response efforts ‘imposed’ from external sources. Agreeing on culturally 
appropriate modifications to burial rights that meet infection control needs, translating disease threats through 
traditional language and folklore, mobilizing traditional systems of response to external threats, and enforcing 
detection and quarantine priorities in partnership rather than in opposition to community leadership are of 
essential importance in securing the safety of external aid workers and facilitating longer term collaboration.
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remaining health personnel in affected communities 
without supervision and without the proper skills to 
respond to the outbreak (Waganar et al., 2018). Lack of 
adequate financing for the existing health infrastructure 
and a lack of supplies contributed further to poor 
containment and management of the Ebola epidemic 
(Waganar et al., 2018). Although external resources 
arrived as part of global health security/emergency 
efforts, it did not address the initial resourcing gaps in 
the primary health care system. Lack of existing medical 
supplies, personal protective equipment, electricity, and 
infection control protocols all increased rates of infection 
(Buseh, Stevens, Bromberg, & Kelber, 2015; Forrester 
et al., 2014; Pathmanathan et al., 2014; Trad, Jurdak, 
& Rana, 2015; WHO, 2015), and delays in diagnostic 
testing and analytics led to poor specimen transfer, and 
coherent collaboration between ambulances, diagnostic 
processing, health officials, and communities (WHO, 
2015).  
A lack of information and existing research infrastructure 
led to WHO reports of weak surveillance, poor 
epidemiological data collection, and statistical analysis 
across the region (McKay, 2015; Trad, Jurdak, & Rana, 
2015).  Experts working on the ground during the 
epidemic also highlighted how severely Ebola negatively 
impacted the delivery of primary health services 
during and after the outbreak (Hayman, 2015; Lewis, 
2015; Polich, 2015; Summers, Nyenswah, Montgomery, 
Neatherlin, & Tappero, 2014).  Basic vaccination 
campaigns were disrupted which led to outbreaks of 
other infectious disease (Bellizzi, 2014; Pillai et al., 2014), 
pregnant women suffering from fever were turned away 
from health facilities, and basic primary healthcare 
was disrupted as human and financial resources were 
concentrated on Ebola response efforts.  Further, the 
location of Ebola treatment facilities created challenges, 
requiring some patients to travel long distances for care. 
Poor roads and infrastructure further delayed transport 
of patients and diagnostic specimens in a safe and timely 
manner.  All of the issues outlined above are symptoms 
of a weak community-level health system. These 
symptoms reinforce the concept that a community’s 
emergency response capabilities are intrinsically 
connected to the broader foundational aspects of a 
strong primary health care system and universal health 
coverage at the community level.
The 2014-15 West African Ebola epidemic underscores 
the need for significant investments in health system 
strengthening, interoperability, data system coordination 
and exchange in Ebola-affected countries and other 
epidemic vulnerable settings (Heen, 2016).  Although 
it took more than a year for Liberia’s health system 
to recover (Heen, 2016), the influx of external funding 
during the crisis helped establish Liberia’s Short 
Messaging Systems (Buseh, Stevens, Bromberg, & Kelber, 
2015) to connect people with Ebola symptoms (or in 
future other infectious diseases) to community resource. 
Community Event Based Surveillance system was also 
created to help strengthen Liberia’s broader surveillance 
and response network to better detect future outbreaks 
(Crowe et al., 2015). In Sierra Leone, an Emergency 
Operations center was established with a toll-free 
national number for Ebola (or infectious disease) related 
health education, alerts, and referrals (Miller et al., 2015). 
In both countries, external funding has contributed 
to stronger government-led infection control training 
protocols, evaluation programs and quality assurance 
metrics (Hayman, 2015; WHO, 2015).  
These developments highlight how external emergency 
response during an epidemic, not least the influx of 
external financial resources, can be an opportunity 
to build the foundational aspects of more resilient 
communities and health systems.  However, despite 
the broad recognition that foundational health system 
strengthening at the community-level is of critical 
importance, we appear to be in a ‘period of neglect’ 
as other international issues take priority and thus 
investment in strengthening vulnerable health systems 
is declining (Yamey et al., 2017). Sustained investment in 
bridging the gap between primary healthcare, universal 
health coverage, and global health security/emergency 
systems is the first and primary operational goal in 
building a resilient community.
Operational Goal 2: Define, map, and 
mobilize various assets and stakeholder 
roles in a community’s unique context.
Operationalizing a harmonized approach to building 
both the foundational aspects of community health 
systems as well as a community’s emergency response 
capabilities requires a systematic way to define, 
map, and mobilize the various assets available within 
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a community.  First and foremost, this requires 
determining who is responsible for community resiliency 
planning, who has oversight of various primary 
healthcare, universal healthcare, and global health 
security related functions, and which government and/or 
parastatal structures have authority and responsibility 
for health system and GHS functions within a defined 
community.  An outbreak may occur across several 
populations, communities, and areas, which may be 
disperse and cross several political and health system 
boundaries.  Which system will define the community, 
the political, legislative, and health system, or other 
structures?  There are often different lines of authority 
and reporting in primary healthcare, universal health 
coverage, and global health security systems.
Community Health Workers (CHW) may be coordinated 
via the health system or via diverse clinic/NGO 
structures and numerous global health security 
related branches of government and municipal service 
authorities operate outside the health system structures 
(i.e. city engineering, sanitation, schools, and police).  
Aligning these platforms, lines of authority, financing 
and reporting structures is critical. Once leadership 
and reporting structures have been defined, those 
responsible for resiliency planning must then be 
supported to carry-out broad based assessments 
of community vulnerability, assets, and resources. 
This entails broadly evaluating the vulnerabilities and 
consequences of epidemics in terms of the social and 
health system issues communities are facing, the 
risks of infrastructure and service disruption, halted 
industrial production, inflated prices and food security, 
crisis-induced fiscal deficits and impoverishment, 
and the myriad social impacts created by disease 
outbreaks (DeWitte, Kurth, Allen, & Linkov, 2016; WHO, 
2009).  Determining a community’s specific needs and 
vulnerabilities, and the roles of specific actors to address 
them, requires thinking through several important key 
questions.  For example, what are the roles of the formal 
health system, at different levels and among different 
types of providers at the community level? What is the 
role of community pharmacies or dispensing outlets?  
What is the role of community health workers or health 
promoters? What is the role of stakeholders from 
outside the health system, such as the diverse range of 
non-profit and civil society entities? How will the vast 
human and financial resources of private businesses, 
workplaces, and employers be mobilized?  How are 
community engineers, firefighters, policy, and military 
involved?  What are the formal and informal leadership 
structures that will guide communication and cultural 
appropriateness during prevention, detection, and 
response? Thinking through these questions highlights 
the vast number of individuals, institutions, private 
sector entities, and diverse community representatives 
involved in making a community function, and 
the various roles they might play in meeting key 
preparedness objectives.
Building on the national Joint External Evaluation 
process, we emphasize the need for a process to 
systematically map “whole community” vulnerability, 
primary healthcare and universal health coverage 
epidemic resilience needs, specific actors and roles 
required, and linking that to inventories of available 
multi-sectoral human, logistic, and financial resources 
in the community.  In doing so, those responsible for 
community preparedness can systematically leverage 
the talent, resources, and assets available across a 
community’s public, private, and civil society sectors.
Once community vulnerabilities have been defined, 
those leading community preparedness efforts can 
systematically define the specific training, infrastructure, 
communication, ‘surge’ response and other direct  
human and financial investments necessary.  By similarly 
mapping out the various public and private sector 
assets and institutions in a given community, leadership 
can define the specific community stakeholders that 
might fulfill, finance, and/or operationally carry-out that 
function. Preparedness planning efforts, as emphasized 
in operational goal 3, can then seek to systematically 
match vulnerabilities to available assets and reveal gaps 
where they exist.
Operational Goal 3: Develop “whole 
community” preparedness and prevention 
plans before epidemics occur.
There is substantial evidence that preventing an 
epidemic via health system strengthening, national 
preparedness and community-based prevention efforts 
is far more cost effective than financing global health 
security/emergency response efforts (Sands, 2017); yet, 
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as the World Bank highlights, we “remain trapped in a 
cycle of panic and neglect, throwing money at disease 
events whenever they occur, but failing to sustain 
investment in preparedness when the panic subsides” 
(WHO, 2009).  As highlighted by FEMA’s frameworks, 
the “whole community” (FEMA, 2018) must be involved 
in building a culture of preparedness, which includes a 
range of individuals and families, including vulnerable 
populations and those with access or functional needs, 
corporate entities and local businesses; faith-based 
groups and civil society community organizations; 
nonprofit groups; schools and academia; media 
outlets; and all levels of government, including state, 
local, tribal, territorial and federal partners (DeWitte, 
Kurth, Allen, & Linkov, 2016) (including community-
level administrative, law enforcement, and military 
structures).   Involving all of these community-based 
actors in the development of epidemic preparedness 
plans and documents at the national, subnational and 
community level is one of the most critical operational 
objectives in building community resilience, as it ensures 
that broad community assets, needs, and roles are 
considered in the development of effective preparedness 
and prevention strategies including primary healthcare, 
universal health coverage, and global health security 
harmonization.
To contextualize this, we highlight the need for stronger 
collaboration between public and private actors at 
the community level.   While companies, businesses, 
and corporations have often been viewed from the 
angle of the environmental and health dangers they 
produce, it is becoming increasing clear that private 
sector and corporate entities of all types have a critical 
role to play in building community preparedness and 
strengthening epidemic prevention efforts (Katz et 
al., 2018). Experience with the HIV/AIDS epidemic in 
Africa demonstrated that, in addition to non-financial 
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humanitarian concerns expressed by private sector 
stakeholders, the length of an epidemic can have 
devastating impacts on working populations, disrupt the 
supply of all types of goods and services, and destroy 
the economic and social fabric of businesses and 
communities (Gilbert, Bourdeaux, & Raphaël, 2010).  
Identifying how public and private entities within a 
defined community can partner during preparedness 
and prevention efforts has the potential to build 
community resilience in numerous ways.  They “reduce 
the burden on the public sector to meet essential 
needs, which allows governments to shift their focus to 
other strategic priorities. Operationally, the diversity of 
supply sources allows the public sector to respond more 
effectively to changing community needs and, tactically, 
the pooling of public and private resources significantly 
improves the efficiency of outbreak response” (Busch & 
Givens, 2013).  The broad range of private sector entities 
both within and external to the health system can be 
critical to raising community awareness about disease 
threats, strengthening surveillance, and leveraging both 
technical and domestic resources from across all sectors 
of society.  Here we emphasize the opportunity to 
develop “whole of society” and “total market approaches 
(TMA)” for international health security, acknowledging 
the broad range of private sector and corporate actors 
that operate in many vulnerable communities. For 
example, the Hong Kong hotel and travel industry 
demonstrates both negative and positive involvement of 
private actors in epidemic prevention and response.  
The Metropole Hotel in Hong Kong was heavily implicated 
in the international spread of Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS) in 2003, where the index cases in the 
Hong Kong, Toronto, Singapore and Hanoi outbreaks 
were all linked to the hotel (Hung, Mark, Yeung, Chan, & 
Graham, 2018).  With no early warning systems in place 
17
Third Annual White Paper • May 2019
Collaboration in Pandemic Preparedness & Response
and no infection control protocols for travelers, the 
Hong Kong travel industry unintentionally contributed to 
the rapid spread of what was then an unknown disease 
(Gilbert, Bourdeaux, & Raphaël, 2010).  SARS eventually 
killed 774 people in 26 countries across five continents 
(WHO, 2003). However, the SARS outbreak in Hong Kong 
led to the creation of Guidelines for Hotels in Preventing 
SARS and other infectious diseases (HKSAR Government, 
Preventing SARS Guidelines for Hotels).  In 2009, these 
guidelines were put to the test with the emergence of 
the (H1N1) influenza virus. When the first imported case 
of swine flu was confirmed in Hong Kong on 1st of May 
2009, the Prevention and Control of Disease Ordinance 
was invoked to establish quarantine measures at the 
Metropark Hotel.  The quarantine ended one week later 
and, according to published literature, these measures 
likely reduced the number of people who were infected 
and required treatment in the Hong Kong outbreak 
(European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, 
2009).  Collaborations between public authorities and 
private entities in Hong Kong’s hotel and travel industry, 
emerging from the failed prevention efforts with SARS 
in 2003, were critical to minimizing impacts to the travel 
and tourism industry during the 2009 H1N1 outbreak.  
Public health authorities have subsequently involved 
hotel personnel in disinfection and hygiene efforts, have 
capacitated hotels for timely reporting and isolation 
of infected guests during outbreaks, and are exploring 
ways to more effectively launch traveler screening 
efforts (Gilbert, Bourdeaux, & Raphaël, 2010).
Conversely, the French public authorities’ response 
to the 2009 A (H1N1) pdm09 “swine flu” outbreak 
demonstrates the dangers of not adequately involving 
and coordinating with key private sector entities as part 
of epidemic preparedness efforts.  The French pandemic 
response plan (2004) emphasized a public health “state 
of emergency” response, but the protracted length of the 
crisis eventually motivated public authorities to consider 
the impact on vital infrastructure and basic services 
and structures of French society (Steyer & Gilbert, 
2013).  To address this, public authorities assembled a 
small number of large, private sector and state-owned 
companies that were recognized as “national critical 
infrastructure operators (CIOs)” (HKSAR Government, 
Preventing SARS Guidelines for Hotels).  Public health 
authorities were faced with the challenge of how to 
effectively mobilize these private entities, and the issue 
required a high level of cooperation between ministries, 
private entities, employees, and public health emergency 
structures.  
A retrospective study of this partnership (HKSAR 
Government, Preventing SARS Guidelines for Hotels) 
reveals a true partnership structure was never achieved, 
private sector entities were disappointed they received 
information at the same time as the public, and they 
were not truly asked to participate in the Economy 
Ministry’s economic continuity taskforce during the 
outbreak. Given the lack of a unified preparedness 
framework that outlined the respective assets, roles, 
and needs of public and private actors, public health 
authorities and large companies ended up taking 
disparate action on the flu epidemic “within the 
framework of a poorly organized system, which itself 
is a risk factor” (HKSAR Government, Preventing SARS 
Guidelines for Hotels) .  The French experience with 
2009 (H1N1) demonstrates the need for more systematic 
integration of private sector entities in preparedness and 
prevention efforts at the community level, to ensure that 
public-private collaboration does not occur ad-hoc at the 
time of a crisis.
These examples demonstrate that building effective 
community resilience to disease threats, public health 
authorities requires learning to work more closely with, 
define, and effectively utilize the broad range of private 
sector, non-governmental, religious and civil society 
organizations that all bring unique capabilities and 
perspectives to each phase of epidemic prevention and 
preparedness at the community level.
Operational Goal 4: Financially and 
technically capacitate diverse community 
actors to carry-out their detection and 
response roles when emergency strikes.
The first line of defense against epidemics is attention 
to the foundational aspects of resilient community 
health systems that can prevent outbreaks. However, a 
resilient community is one where preparedness plans 
include contingencies for when prevention efforts have 
failed. As outlined above, a resilient community will have 
paid attention to bridging primary healthcare, universal 
health coverage, and emergency response structures; 
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will have mapped and defined the key assets, needs, 
and roles of a diverse group of community partners; and 
will have involved those partners in early preparedness 
and prevention planning before emergencies occur. 
Unfortunately, without these foundational aspects of 
preparedness in place, the most vulnerable communities 
are often behind in detection and response even 
before an epidemic strikes.  The international historical 
experience demonstrates that a surge of personnel, 
financing, and treatment facilities is often needed to 
contain an epidemic.  This requires the ability to rapidly 
direct resources to the community actors who will 
have the most impact on reinforcing failing aspects 
of the health system and community structures.  Our 
experience with the HIV/AIDS epidemic, the 2014-15 West 
African Ebola crisis, annual international flu campaigns, 
and other infectious disease outbreaks demonstrate that 
numerous community actors provide a broad range of 
educational, financial, technical, and cultural assets in 
both detecting and responding to an epidemic.  Here, 
we highlight the importance of including these diverse 
community actors in detection and response strategies, 
and acknowledging that historically they have not always 
been recognized, financed, or capacitated for the critical 
roles they play in containing and overcoming epidemics 
at the community and household level. The crucial roles 
of community health workers and religious leaders 
are briefly described below to contextualize current 
problems and opportunities for stronger responses.
Well-trained community-based healthcare workers 
such as clinical officers, nurses, midwives, birth 
attendants, and community health workers; community 
healthcare committees and fora; and community health 
leadership structures are all crucial resources in building 
community-level resiliency.  Community-based health 
workers and community health personnel strengthen 
community resiliency by enhancing access to essential 
primary healthcare services in vulnerable health 
system contexts. They are key sources of information 
and education for households about infection control 
protocols and disease prevention efforts, as well as for 
frontline detection and rapid communication to the 
health system.  They also serve as crucial and preferred 
sources of service delivery during a community’s 
response to emergencies.  Community health workers 
can effectively promote seasonal influenza vaccination 
programs (Ding et al., 2015; Hemingway & Poehling, 
2004; Santibanez, Mootrey, Euler, & Janssen, 2010) and 
were a trusted source of advice and education (Siekmans 
et al., 2017) during the 2014-15 Ebola epidemic, and in 
conflict and situations of unrest, including the South 
Sudan displacements in late 2013/14 (Kozuki, Ericson, 
Marron, Lainez, & Miller, 2018). They remained active, 
sourcing supplies where they could, in order to continue 
key programs such as integrated comprehensive 
community case management. 
However, community health workers are put under 
tremendous strain at the community-level during an 
epidemic and there is evidence from the 2014-15 Ebola 
epidemic that routine service delivery structures were 
overwhelmed. Numerous West African children were put 
at risk due to lack of common treatments for malaria, 
pneumonia, diarrhea, and malnutrition (Santibanez, 
Mootrey, Euler, & Janseen, 2019). A study from China 
highlights, although many community-based healthcare 
workers are active in national vaccination campaigns, 
they do not have the requisite information to confront 
barriers to vaccination coverage. A separate study of 
health personnel and community-based health workers 
knowledge of Ebola and antimicrobial resistance risks 
further demonstrates both the impact and priority for 
increased information campaigns among community-
based health personnel.  In the period following Liberia’s 
Ebola epidemic, an overwhelming majority (95.4%) of 
community-based health workers had recent knowledge 
of the dangers of Ebola, while far fewer (17.2%) were 
aware antimicrobial resistance was a problem (Yusuf, 
Arzai, Yushau, & Garba, 2015). 
Experiences responding to the 2014-2016 cholera 
outbreak in Kenya (one of the country’s largest) also 
demonstrates that community-based healthcare workers 
are often left to respond to epidemics without the 
requisite supplies, financial resources, and materials 
(Curran et al., 2018).  Health facilities lacked key materials 
for detecting, diagnosing, and treating cases of cholera; 
while weak infrastructure, lack of water, sanitation, 
and basic hygiene interventions led to failed infection 
control. Without these critical supplies and materials, 
community-based health workers and health personnel 
reported feeling helpless in their ability to detect and 
respond to the epidemic (Siekmans et al., 2017). The 
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challenge of determining appropriate surge financing 
to support scaled community-based health worker 
responses is significant. In the case of influenza (Song 
et al., 2017), Ebola (Miller et al., 2018; Hemingway & 
Poehling, 20014), and cholera (Siekmans et al., 2017) 
community-based healthcare workers have lacked 
sufficient financial support and instruction to carry 
out their vital detection and response capabilities.  
Further investment in coordinating, sufficiently staffing, 
managing, and mobilizing community-based health 
worker assets is a crucial priority to both PHC-UHC 
efforts before and between epidemics, and promoting 
rapid and effective community-based detection and 
response when an emergency occurs. Ensuring that 
community-based health workers are equipped with 
the information and technical tools they require is an 
immediate first step.
The Ebola epidemic in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone 
highlighted the vital role religious leaders and traditional 
healers played in helping communities overcome the 
outbreak.  In the face of service delivery failures, lack 
of an immediate vaccine or treatment, and limited 
information among community members (not unlike 
early experience with the HIV/AIDS epidemic) – the early 
response to Ebola in many West African communities 
necessarily focused on prevention and containment 
(Bah & Aljoudi, 2014).  However, while national and 
international response efforts focused on the biomedical 
response, “the traditional leaders were operating from a 
diametrically opposite perspective” (Curran et al., 2018).  
Prevention and containment efforts were frustrated by 
false rumors, ignorance, and harmful cultural practices; 
in particular, public health measures to cremate bodies 
and enforce quarantine created tremendous social 
upheaval (Pellecchia, Crestani, Decroo, Van den Bergh, & 
Al-kourdi, 2015). 
Lack of knowledge about West Africa’s diverse religious 
landscape initially restricted formal engagement of 
religious leaders, and delayed formal partnerships 
(Curran et al., 2018); however, while many communities 
reported that state-led efforts created a climate of 
fear (Song et al., 2017), there were numerous faith-
based and religious people and institutions mobilized 
to address the epidemic. Given the significant public 
distrust of government health and emergency services, 
these community-based organizations were of critical 
importance in reducing community fear, leveraging 
existing relationships and building trust, communicating 
necessary cultural adaptations (i.e. for prevention), 
and eventually in linking the community to broader 
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Ebola response efforts and facilitating the access of 
external aid agencies. For example, initiatives from 
Caritas Internationalis and the Methodist Church 
provided bedside care through community health 
workers, delivered health messaging to congregations, 
and offered care for abandoned orphans (Marshall & 
Smith, 2015).  Strengthening two-way communication 
with communities is a critical component of building 
their resilience, and therefore due respect should be 
paid to community expertise concentrated in religious 
institutions (Miller et al., 2018).  Change in funeral 
practices, explaining to communities why burial or 
cremation was necessary, and reducing the fear, 
isolation, and social-breakdown community members 
felt was critical to reversing the Ebola epidemic (Song et 
al., 2017; Miller et al., 2018).  Of key importance, these 
successful community-based efforts were led by a broad 
range of modern and traditional, Muslim and Christian 
religious leaders working largely in isolation from state-
led efforts.   Public health authorities and international 
stakeholders must therefore seek to fully appreciate 
and benefit from the immense cultural and geographic 
presence of religious leaders and faith-based institutions 
already present in vulnerable communities.  A resilient 
community is therefore one that includes religious actors 
in both primary healthcare and universal health coverage 
systems strengthening broadly, and in well-defined 
epidemic preparedness plans for prevention, detection, 
and response.
Conclusion 
As outlined above, a resilient community is one where 
multiple vulnerabilities, needs, and capacity gaps have 
been well-defined and where those needs have been 
systematically mapped to all possible human and 
institutional assets in the community; where synergies 
have been strengthened between the primary healthcare 
system and emergency response stakeholders, and 
where the whole community (within and external to 
the health system) is involved before, during, and after 
a health emergency. In seeking to operationalize GHS 
priorities, communities must be capacitated financially 
and technically to carry-out the planning, coordination, 
and infrastructure improvements required as part of 
building preparedness now. It is important to note, 
however, that the challenge of establishing community 
resilience in fragile or failing states is different from that 
of low-and-middle income countries. The operational 
goals and recommendations may not apply in part or in 
full to fragile or failing states. We outlined below several 
priority recommendations based on the lessons and 
operational guidance raised in this chapter, and advocate 
for immediate and strong support to assist communities 
in building their own cultures of preparedness.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1) Continue investments in health systems  
     strengthening at the community level  
     with specific attention to Global Health  
     Security Agenda related priorities.  
Utilize health systems strengthening investments to 
strengthen local health management systems, and 
build global health security related capacities in human 
resources for health, diagnostic, surveillance, transport, 
medical supply, and sanitation at the community-
level. By doing so, investments in primary healthcare-
universal health coverage and global health security 
can be cross-leveraged to build both the foundational 
aspects of resilient health systems, as well as the 
emergency capabilities for detection and response when 
needed. In addition, by coordinating health information 
21
Third Annual White Paper • May 2019
Collaboration in Pandemic Preparedness & Response
management systems and ensuring strategic data 
exchange between primary healthcare and global health 
security stakeholders, interoperability can be built to 
take full advantage of data collected.
2) Reinforce and rethink the critical role  
     of community health workers, religious  
     leadership, and cultural factors in epidemic  
     response.  
As outlined in this chapter, lack of capacity among 
community health workers weakened responses to 
Ebola, Zika, cholera, and other disease outbreaks. 
Community health workers are central in providing 
primary healthcare-universal health coverage and 
global health security emergency response functions, 
and are historically insufficiently resourced, prepared, 
or supported in their critical roles. We must rethink and 
reinforce the critical role community health workers play 
in community-level health systems.  Similarly, recent 
Ebola outbreaks have underscored the critical role 
religious and cultural leaders or institutions play in either 
supporting or inhibiting outbreak responses. We must 
rethink the role of community-based religious leadership 
in communicating key information (i.e. quarantine or 
burial protocols) to their community. As such, religious 
and cultural leaders are key resources to be included in 
early preparedness planning exercises.  
3)  Invest immediately in developing community- 
     level rapid detection and reporting platforms,  
     aligned closely with the existing primary  
     healthcare-universal health coverage systems,  
     for multiple infectious diseases and all-hazard  
     public health threats.   
Preparing communities for early detection and 
response involves, first and foremost, ensuring there 
are ways to quickly report a wide variety of novel 
threats or outbreaks from the community-level to 
national health stakeholders. This includes developing 
technical infrastructure and performance capacities 
of health workers in outbreak vulnerable settings, 
leveraging digital technology in strategic ways, ensuring 
community-level stakeholders are aware of and updated 
on their roles, capacitated with necessary equipment 
and information, and participate in routine detection and 
response exercises.  
4) Invest in and promote community-level  
     preparedness mapping exercises to  
     systematically reveal and inventory a  
     community’s epidemic resiliency vulnerabilities,  
     needs, and assets.  
Mapping exercises should build on the national level 
Joint External Evaluation process and build on existing 
community health and emergency management 
structures. Mapping should be focused on “whole 
communities” including and involving a broad range of 
multi-sectoral and community representatives to create 
inventories of a specific community’s resiliency gaps 
and human or financial assets. By investing in creating 
and implementing a systematic approach to community 
preparedness mapping, communities will be able to 
involve a broad range of community-based, religious, 
and private sector partners who can fully participate 
in creating preparedness, detection, and response 
strategies. This process should also seek to uncover 
information and data points that are most essential 
to community leaders, in order to help ensure they 
routinely receive this information to help make more 
informed preparedness decisions.
5) Provide financial and technical assistance  
     to help community leadership develop  
     community-based epidemic preparedness  
     and response plans before and between  
     outbreaks. 
This assistance should include an emphasis on the co-
creation of plans with the full range of community actors 
identified during mapping exercises. Planning exercises 
should ensure that core vulnerabilities are matched to 
available assets, noting where various community actors 
can contribute one or more core technical, financial, 
prevention, detection, or response competencies.  
This includes clarifying roles, reporting requirements, 
communication, and data collection systems early – 
to ensure all actors are fully involved and informed 
throughout planning processes. Historically, private 
sector and non-state actors have been weakly involved 
or involved too late in outbreak preparedness. Ensuring 
that the full range of private sector actors are provided 
with or possess the financial and technical capacity to 
carry-out their preparedness and prevention functions is 
a critical priority at the community-level.
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Our 2018 White Paper focused on the need to develop 
a strategic direction for United States and international 
leadership in pandemic preparedness and response; 
more clearly define leadership roles for governments, 
international organizations, and other actors involved 
in pandemic response; and promote communication 
between agencies and with the public during biological 
crises. The 2018 recommendations also emphasized 
the need for strong U.S. leadership on an international 
scale for health emergencies and the importance of 
establishing a clear, coordinated, and tiered international 
response framework for pandemics. Against the 
backdrop of the ongoing and second largest Ebola 
outbreak in history, our 2019 recommendations 
emphasize the urgency with which the U.S. and 
international partners need to resolve these and other 
longstanding challenges with leadership, command and 
control, and crisis coordination and communication. In 
2019, we also urge the Administration to designate a 
senior-level White House lead for pandemic response, 
as well as pandemic preparedness that devotes full 
attention to biodefense and global health security. 
Finally, we recommend routinized, rigorous and targeted 
pandemic simulations at all levels of government and 
within the non-governmental and academic sectors and 
to train the next generation for biological crises of the 
future.
Last year, following the issuance of our 2018 
recommendations and pursuant to a Congressional 
requirement in the 2017 National Defense Authorization 
Act, President Trump signed National Security 
Presidential Memorandum (NSPM)-14 and issued a 
new National Biodefense Strategy (Strategy). The new 
Strategy supersedes the previous biodefense strategies 
issued by President George W. Bush (Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive-10) and President Barack Obama 
(Presidential Policy Directive-2).
TOPIC AREA 2: STRENGTHENING UNITED STATES 
FEDERAL COORDINATION & LEADERSHIP
Authors: Elizabeth Cameron & Gerald W. Parker Jr.
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The Strategy takes several important steps forward. 
First, it defines the requirement and mandates an 
implementation plan that designates clear roles and 
responsibilities for U.S. departments and agencies 
involved in the broader biodefense enterprise needed 
for pandemic prevention, preparedness, detection, 
response, and recovery. Second, it defines biodefense 
comprehensively to include U.S. international, as well 
as domestic, and prioritizes prevention, detection 
and response to pandemics – whether from naturally 
occurring, deliberate, or accidental threats to humans, 
animals, agriculture, and the environment. And finally, it 
emphasizes the need for a stronger and well-integrated 
budget process for biodefense, recognizing the many 
disparate appropriations involved in biodefense, 
pandemic preparedness, response, and global health 
security.
In signing NSPM-14, President Trump designated the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) as 
the lead federal agency for biodefense and created a 
new Biodefense Steering Committee chaired by the 
HHS Secretary. The Steering Committee is to oversee 
and coordinate the implementation of the Strategy. 
Additionally, NSPM-14 creates a Biodefense Coordination 
Team to support the Biodefense Steering Committee, 
but provides the Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs (National Security Advisor) with the 
responsibility for policy coordination, review, and 
integration for federal biodefense efforts. Unfortunately, 
however, while the HHS Secretary and National Security 
Advisor are certainly key players for biodefense, 
pandemic preparedness, and response, the new NSPM 
and Strategy stop short of identifying a senior-level 
White House lead for coordinating the U.S. response 
to pandemics that cross borders. High consequence 
biological threats with pandemic potential will cross 
borders impacting our national security, economy, and 
health; and are by definition international crisis.
Meanwhile, Congressional interest in pandemic 
preparedness, response, and global health security 
is on the rise. In 2018, non-governmental health and 
security organizations came together to prioritize 
Congressional outreach for Members and staff to 
increase awareness of emerging risks, encourage 
cross-jurisdictional coordination, and even participate 
in pandemic simulations. Nevertheless, Congressional 
interest and ability to effect synergist authorities and 
appropriations remains fragmented, in large part 
owing to circumscribed remits for relevant committees 
that focus either on domestic matters or international 
priorities – but which rarely or equally prioritize 
both. Unfortunately, this structure doesn’t serve U.S. 
pandemic preparedness and response well. For example, 
CDC, USAID, DOD, and State resources are all vital in 
preparing for and responding to different aspects of 
natural, deliberate, and accidental biological crises. No 
matter where a fast-spreading pandemic originates, it is 
likely to spread to the United States in a matter of hours. 
And despite the often-siloed approach to pandemics 
that has occurred in Congress in the past, some strong, 
non-partisan efforts emerged in the 115th Congress to 
bridge these gaps. These include continued bipartisan 
support for the Pandemic and All-Hazard Preparedness 
and Innovation Reauthorization Act and recognition that 
global health security is a core national security interest. 
We encourage these efforts to continue and grow in the 
116th Congress.
Importance of White House-Level 
Leadership
There is still no clear designated lead for pandemic 
response in the White House; this situation should be 
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clarified immediately. While the Trump Administration 
has rightly placed an emphasis on pandemic 
preparedness, there is not yet a clear interface between 
the new HHS-led Biodefense Steering Group and the 
existing and vital National Security Council (NSC)-led 
coordination for global health security and biodefense.
NSPM-14 designates the HHS Secretary as the lead 
for coordinating implementation of the new National 
Biodefense Strategy. The NSPM also designates the 
National Security Advisor, and thus the White House, 
as the overall lead for policy coordination, review, and 
integration for federal biodefense efforts. Additionally, 
the new Strategy codifies the Executive Order on 
Advancing the Global Health Security Agenda, which 
created a senior-level White House-led Global Health 
Security Agenda Interagency Review Council to oversee 
coordination of U.S. efforts to advance health security 
preparedness with international partners. Each of 
these efforts is important for advancing relevant U.S. 
and international preparedness policy, and they rightly 
recognize the intersection between U.S. domestic 
pandemic preparedness and global health security – the 
Administration should be commended for prioritizing 
them.
However, none of these processes clarify who would be 
in charge of providing strategic-level coordination of U.S. 
operations during a pandemic crisis with – inevitably – a 
domestic and international nexus. HHS will play a major 
role in both instances, but during a major biological 
crises will be unable to coordinate, provide direction 
for, or gain resource commitments from Department 
of State Chiefs of Mission; Department of Defense 
assets and operators; arbitration for disputes regarding 
movement and monitoring policy, calls for travel 
bans, and Disaster Assistance Response Team assets; 
international investigations and forensics to attribute 
deliberate attacks from natural outbreaks. In addition, 
each responsible U.S. department and agency will carry 
a different culture, risk tolerance, and aversion to action. 
One Cabinet official will not be able to overcome these 
with another. Past outbreak experience tells us that 
senior level leadership in the White House is essential 
to effect a strategic level response, and must be in place 
before the crisis.
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In 2014 the United States spent several months juggling 
federal leads for coordinating different aspects of 
the Ebola response until Ron Klain was designated as 
the White House Ebola Response Coordinator. Those 
intervening months inevitably cost lives. The designation 
of a senior White House official with the authority to 
communicate directly with the President and White 
House Chief of Staff, and then to cabinet heads and 
multinational organization leaders was a turning point 
not only for coordinating the U.S. Ebola response 
domestically and internationally, but also for driving 
an effective multi-national international response. It is 
important to note that the White House Ebola Response 
Coordinator provided the necessary strategic level 
coordination and action, but did not micromanage 
leaders in the field. The response coordinator ensured 
strategic level decisions were made and effectively 
communicated amongst the Cabinet, so leaders in the 
field had the resources to respond more effectively. This 
not only had a positive impact on Ebola response, but 
also on U.S. national security. 
In 2016, the Obama Administration designated the 
position of Deputy Homeland Security Advisor to 
serve as the lead U.S. coordinator for Ebola, Zika, 
and ultimately pandemic response.  In addition, the 
Administration stood up a new National Security 
Council staff Directorate on Global Health Security and 
Biodefense to focus on domestic and international 
pandemic preparedness, and to bridge the gap between 
biodefense and global health security, reporting to 
the Deputy Homeland Security Advisor, Assistant to 
the President for National Security Affairs (National 
Security Advisor), and the Assistant to the President for 
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism. While the 
Trump Administration maintained much of this structure 
for several months, it has since been largely dissolved.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1) Designate senior-level White House leadership  
     for pandemic response and pandemic  
     preparedness.
In order to fully increase America’s ability to prepare 
for and respond to the next pandemic, there must be 
a designated senior-level White House official tasked 
with leadership in both pandemic preparedness and 
response. We argue that this position should be housed 
in the White House because this person must have the 
authority to make recommendations and get timely 
decisions requiring multi-level, multi-agency action. Key 
attributes of this position include an absolute need to 
have the ear of the President and have easy access to 
he, or she, when presidential-level input is necessary. 
The intent is not to micromanage field-level operators, 
but provide strategic-level decisions to ensure field 
leaders have the resources needed through streamlined 
interagency action. This position must be permanent 
and cannot effectively be established ad-hoc after a 
disease outbreak is ongoing. Without this permanent, 
White House-level position and elevated attention on 
biodefense, the United States will remain unprepared for 
the next pandemic. 
2) Designate specific roles and responsibilities  
     for U.S. Departments and Agencies during a  
     pandemic response.
Each U.S. department and agency should know – and 
exercise – its specific roles and responsibilities in a 
pandemic response. These should be clear to other 
departments and agencies.  NSPM-14 directs the 
development of, “…a proposal for metrics, milestones, 
end states, and roles and responsibilities of agencies, 
with respect to biodefense activities, particularly in 
meeting the goals, objectives, and sub-objectives of the 
Strategy.”  This requirement was due by February 2019. 
Once finalized, we recommend that these deliverables 
will be published and transparently communicated to 
the broader biodefense enterprise at state, local, tribal, 
non-government organizations, and private sector 
stakeholders; and to the American public at large.
Historically, particularly in the absence of designated 
senior-level White House leadership for pandemic 
response, the U.S. Government has experienced 
challenges with developing pandemic response plans 
that are flexible enough to adapt to any emerging 
scenario. During the 2014-2016 West African Ebola 
epidemic and the 2015-2016 Zika outbreak, U.S. officials 
were unable to rely on existing response plans crafted 
for pandemic influenza. This was because the U.S. 
Government did not anticipate a large-scale Ebola 
outbreak with global consequences, Zika carried an 
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unusual and unexpected threat to pregnant women 
and unborn children, and both diseases originated 
from world regions that lacked preparation and needed 
public health response capacities. These outbreaks also 
presented novel diplomatic and security challenges 
not previously contemplated but must be factored 
into future whole of government response plans that 
currently lacks a coherent U.S. policy foundation. 
Former officials point to the existence of a pathogen-
independent interagency rubric for pandemic response, 
spearheaded by the White House near the end of the 
Obama Administration, which also instituted regular 
monitoring of circulating diseases with pandemic 
potential and leadership reporting to prevent future flat-
footedness.
3) Unify and integrate biodefense priorities  
     in the federal budget process.
The Administration should clarify the way in which 
biodefense requirements and gaps will be prioritized 
in the federal budget process.  In 2015, the Blue Ribbon 
Study Panel on Biodefense recommended a unified 
budget process within the Executive Office of the 
President for identifying and requesting biodefense-
related resources (Blue Ribbon Panel on Biodefense, 
2015). NSPM-14 requires departments and agencies 
to include biodefense priorities in the annual budget 
cycle, submit those priorities to the HHS-led Biodefense 
Coordination Team, and send a report to the National 
Security Advisor and the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB).  However, the NSPM does not clarify the 
process by which – or direct any change to – how OMB 
should integrate and prioritize those budget requests. 
Additionally, there is no requirement within NSPM-14 or 
the National Biodefense Strategy for OMB to prioritize 
those requests – and for Department/Agencies to 
elevate biodefense requirements at the expense of 
other programs– in the context of competing budgetary 
public health, animal health, national security, and 
other defense requirements. The President should 
direct OMB to prioritize biodefense spending, including 
domestic preparedness and global health security, in 
a manner more consistent with U.S. defense spending. 
Congress should also find innovative ways to work across 
committees and disparate appropriations to create a 
more integrated budgeting approach to pandemics 
preparedness and response, biodefense, and global 
health security recognizing the dual importance of 
domestic spending at home and development assistance 
abroad to stop outbreaks at the source wherever they 
may occur and before they become pandemic threats.
4) Significantly enhance pandemic-related  
     coordination across Congressional  
     committees, members, and staff.
Congress should establish clear mechanisms to 
coordinate policy, as well as budgetary, requirements 
for pandemic preparedness and response across 
Committees. We recommend consideration of a 
dedicated bicameral working group at the staff level for 
these issues.  Recently, the Global Health Council and 
the CSIS Health Security Commission, in collaboration 
with the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, 
held pandemic simulations for Congressional staff 
and Members. Throughout 2018, non-governmental 
organizations prioritized briefings for Members 
of Congress and staff, with an emphasis on cross-
committee discussion. While progress has been made in 
prioritizing the issue, domestic and internationally-facing 
health security legislation remains largely stove-piped.
5) Pandemic simulations should be conducted  
     regularly, on a specific timeline, across agencies, 
     with international counterparts, and with  
     Congressional involvement.
Simulations are a powerful tool for creating and 
maintaining political will and momentum to solve critical 
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challenges in pandemic preparedness and response. 
Much progress has been made since the Ebola crisis 
of 2014-2016 to prioritize national and international 
simulations of complex biological crises. For example, 
the 2017-2018 and 2019-2020 U.S. National Exercise 
Program cycles designate pandemics as a major 
objective for simulations conducted at the Cabinet-level 
(FEMA, 2018; FEMA, 2018b). On an international level, in 
2017 during the German G-20 Presidency, G-20 Health 
Ministers conducted their first-ever pandemic simulation 
(Bundesministerum für Gesundheit, 2017). Finally, 
the World Health Organization (WHO) has prioritized 
simulation exercises to help countries identify and fill 
gaps in pandemic preparedness and International Health 
Regulations implementation (WHO, 2019). However, 
pandemic simulations involving international leaders 
remain relatively ad-hoc and usually do not involve 
relevant political leaders, health officials, and finance 
and security sectors. We recommend national and 
international leadership simulations should occur on 
an annual basis. These should involve political directors 
and Heads of State, as well as Health Ministers, Finance 
Ministers, and security and defense sector leaders.
Specifically, we recommend:
1. At least one annual pandemic exercise for Cabinet-
level officials within the U.S. Government that 
focuses on one or more specific aspects of response 
to a complex pandemic event, including plausible 
scenarios for deliberate biological attacks;
2. G-20 and/or G-7 pandemic simulations should 
include Ministers and other senior officials with 
responsibilities across health, security, finance, 
defense, and development;
3. A Heads of State-level simulation should be 
conducted in 2019 or 2020 by the G-7 and/or G-20;
4. The WHO and World Organization for Animal 
Health should prioritize annual simulations in each 
region with a publicly available after action report 
identifying key recommendations;
5. Bilateral efforts to advance health security and 
biosecurity should include pandemic simulations of 
unusual and high consequence biological events; and
6. A new program of pandemic simulations should 
be identified, funded, and coordinated for 
undergraduate and graduate students among 
universities that prioritize global health security with 
demonstrated success enabling transdisciplinary 
collaborations. Specific opportunities should be 
created that includes the integration of science and 
policy for international collaboration among students 
through such simulations.
6) The United States should provide leadership  
     for biodefense, global health security,  
     and biological crisis response.
Some recommendations are worth repeating. Our 
sixth and final recommendation for strengthening 
coordination and leadership is that the U.S. should 
not only remain engaged, but should provide critical 
international leadership before and during high 
consequence pandemic events. During the 2014-2016 
Ebola response, CDC and USAID funding received 
a significant increase, funding which has led not 
only to measurable international preparedness and 
international security gains but has also protected U.S. 
jobs and exports (CDC, 2019) and deployed a core group 
of biodefense personnel who have enhanced epidemic 
intelligence at home. The funding provided for these 
activities under the Ebola supplemental is largely spent 
and will expire at the end of Fiscal Year 2019. Continued 
U.S. leadership to advance preparedness abroad is 
essential to stop outbreaks at their source and before 
they become epidemics or pandemics.
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An estimated 50-90 million people worldwide (500,000 
in the United States of America (US)) perished during 
the deadly 1918 Influenza outbreak. A hundred years 
later, more than 11,000 deaths and nearly 30,000 cases 
occurred across 10 countries during the 2013-2016 
West African Ebola outbreak. Liberia, Sierra Leone and 
Guinea experienced an economic loss of $2.2 billion. 
Additionally, the outbreak spurred panic, social upheaval, 
and increased physical insecurity. The failure of 
international leadership, country coordination, and local 
ownership characterized the response. The erosion of 
trust culminated in the brutal murder of health workers 
that came to help.
Infectious disease outbreaks are inevitable due to rapid 
population growth, dietary transitions of emerging 
economies, irrational antibiotic use and the narrowing 
human-wildlife interface. Current vertical programs 
and disease focused surveillance and programming 
have fractured health systems in vulnerable countries 
where the majority (>70%) of the last decade’s outbreaks 
occurred.
A review of the weaknesses that led to these unfortunate 
events, have promoted the Global Health Security 
Agenda and the Joint External Evaluations ( JEE), which 
help countries meet the obligations of the International 
Health Regulations (2005). The JEE’s have shown low 
levels of pandemic preparedness, especially in high-risk 
countries. Also in response, the US biodefense strategy 
developed in 2018, addresses threats from biosecurity 
and bioterrorism, but emphasizes interventions that 
protect US borders. Fortunately, the flexibility of the 
biodefense strategy and the continuing support for 
the Global Health Security Agenda still provide an 
opportunity for the US to lead international action 
against future pandemics. 
NOT JUST BIRD TALK: REFLECTIONS FROM  
THE FOURTH PANDEMIC INFLUENZA SUMMIT*
Author: Emmanuel Agogo
*The opinions expressed here are those of Dr. Agogo, personally, and not of the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (NCDC).
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RECOMMENDATIONS
1) Committed leadership is required at subnational, 
     national, regional and international levels. 
Investments in leadership development and 
establishment of national public health institutes is 
necessary to deliver essential public health functions 
(surveillance, response and coordination) as part of a 
national and global health security infrastructure.
2) Multi-sector coordination and whole-of- 
     government planning, aimed at building  
     resilient health systems guided by the  
     One Health approach, can advance efforts  
     to integrate human, animal, and environmental  
     sectors in pandemic preparedness.
Supporting a One Health approach implemented by 
multidisciplinary teams (of health and non-health 
professionals) developing a whole of society strategy 
for pandemic preparedness and response can build 
resilience where the risks exist.
3) Culturally sensitive interventions informed  
     by contextual anthropological and sociological  
     evidence are required. 
For effective community engagement, we should change 
the paradigm of working in silos focused on narrow 
priorities and investigate the cultural ecologies and 
belief systems, which drive infections. Lack of situational 
awareness undermined post-mortem interventions 
in 1918 and during the 2014-16 Ebola outbreak. Local 
conflict still complicates the ongoing Ebola response in 
Congo DRC (2018-19).
4) Building trust between stakeholders of pandemic 
     preparedness and response is crucial. 
Trust building should start with redefining ‘health 
security’. Understanding the continuum from health 
system strengthening, universal health coverage, and 
the linkage with health security (figure 1) is an important 
step in the de-securitization of health. We could 
progress from ‘global health security’ and aspire towards 
‘Universal Health Security’ as a human right.
Figure 1: Linking health security and health systems (Source: WHO, 2017)
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The University Reward Structure
The academic structure, particularly universities, are 
indispensable to biodefense, global health security, and 
pandemic preparedness and response. Research centers, 
institutes, and individual faculty are producing innovative 
work in the areas of the humanities, social sciences, and 
bench sciences, which are helping to address some of 
the biggest gaps and challenges in preparing for the next 
pandemic. While the role of universities in pandemic 
preparedness and response is extremely important, 
effective university engagement will require new models 
to encourage interdisciplinary research, next generation 
education, and service.  
For decades, faculty and administrators alike have 
debated whether the traditional tenure system is 
antiquated. Specifically, many criticize the university 
reward structure as a whole for rewarding narrowly 
focused, non-applied research that clashes with the 
broader mission of universities themselves (Reskin, 
1977; Boyer, 1990; Wolcott, 1997; Seigel, Waldman, 
Atwater, & Link, 2003; Boardman & Ponomariov, 
2007). As Boardman & Ponomariov (2007) explain, “...
the traditional academic reward system is ill suited 
to provide university scientists incentive to perform 
research and other activities that diverge from the 
publication of peer-reviewed basic research…” (p. 64). 
Furthermore, the reward systems of universities does 
not match the daily tasks that are required of its faculty, 
with research as the single most important component 
of tenure and teaching, applied work holds much less 
value (Kasten, 1984; Boardman & Ponomariov, 2007). 
With regards to teaching, which is an important and 
time consuming requirement for most faculty members, 
excellence is not viewed as sufficient for tenure or 
promotion (Kasten, 1984). Put differently, excellent 
teaching in the absence of excellent scholarship does 
not qualify a faculty member for promotion within the 
TOPIC AREA 3: CHANGING THE REWARD STRUCTURE
Author: Christine Crudo Blackburn
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university reward structure, while excellent research in 
the absence of excellent teaching, does. 
Other duties aside, the traditional university reward 
structure also constrains the type of research that can 
be conducted. A study conducted by Siegel, Waldman, 
Atwater, and Link (2003) found that there is bias in tenure 
and promotion. Specifically, tenure and promotion 
decisions favor single-discipline and basic research over 
applied and commercially relevant research (Siegel et 
al., 2003). Thus, if a faculty member, specifically a junior 
faculty member would like to focus on interdisciplinary 
and/or applied research, they do so at the risk of career 
advancement. Boardman & Ponomariov (2007) found 
that most junior faculty view working in research centers 
as time that is taken away from advancing their careers 
and those that choose to do applied, interdisciplinary 
work in research centers do so not for career 
advancement, but to do good in society. The study 
concluded that, “...the current university reward system 
in the U.S. may indeed be deterring junior-level scientists 
from performing the applied and commercially relevant 
research the ‘Research 1’ universities encourage and 
tout in their research mission statements” (Boardman & 
Ponomariov, 2007, p. 54).   
In the area of infectious disease and pandemic 
preparedness and response, this is concerning because 
solutions cannot be developed within one discipline. As 
Armstrong (2006) stated, health issues are complex and 
“It is now abundantly clear that no single discipline can 
or should have a monopoly on the search for creative 
solutions” (p. 761). Not only should interdisciplinary 
research be encouraged rather than discouraged, but 
teaching should be awarded greater value in the tenure 
and promotion process. Through teaching, faculty are 
training the next generation of pandemic experts and 
responders and this contribution should be valued as 
such.
The Funding Reward Structure
 The university reward system is not the only 
deterrent of applied, interdisciplinary research. In 
addition to tenure and promotion, funding priorities 
can discourage certain types of research. A 1985 study 
by Porter and Rossini found that that National Science 
Foundation (NSF) reviewers favored proposals that were 
familiar to them, i.e. related to their fields of expertise. 
Additionally, the study found that NSF reviewers 
discriminated against interdisciplinary research. 
If both the university reward structure and the funding 
reward structure dissuade interdisciplinary, applied 
work, the global health community is at a significant 
disadvantage. Universities have enormous expertise 
and resources which, utilized correctly, to include 
partnering with international universities, could provide 
indispensable knowledge and solutions to some of 
the greatest pandemic preparedness and response 
challenges. As it stands now, however, doing such work 
is at the expense of career advancement and funding 
opportunities. 
RECOMMENDATIONS
1) Place more value on applied interdisciplinary  
     work within the university reward structure.
The most significant threats facing the world--whether 
they are disease, climate change, nuclear threats, etc.--
cannot be solved within one disciplinary box. University 
reward structures should recognize the need for and 
value of interdisciplinary, applied research and service. 
Work within private sector companies and publications 
outside of single-discipline journals should be viewed 
as valuable contributions and apply toward tenure. 
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Some concern has been raised about the difficulty 
with establishing a standardized evaluation system for 
interdisciplinary research, but this challenge can be 
overcome by creating interdisciplinary review panels. 
With interdisciplinary panels, portions of publications 
and projects could be evaluated by experts in those 
specific areas, which would provide a full picture of the 
quality and value of the work.
2) Encourage interdisciplinary research  
     in the next generation.
The traditional graduate school model often discourages 
students from pursuing interdisciplinary education and 
research. Many of the societal challenges today, however, 
require multi-sectoral solutions, including pandemic 
preparedness. Faculty must do more to promote 
interdisciplinary education and research, but the siloed 
structure of academia inhibits faculty and creates the 
feeling for students that they will not be able to build 
a successful career if they cross traditional disciplinary 
boundaries. While some universities are working to 
change this, more must be done to encourage faculty to 
promote, and for students to pursue, interdisciplinary 
work. Texas A&M University has recognized this problem 
and initiated an internal Tier-One educational grant 
program (TOP) to promote interdisciplinary and new 
transformative learning models. The Scowcroft Institute 
of International Affairs was awarded a TOP grant in 
2018 and is establishing a new curriculum-focused 
on pandemic preparedness and biosecurity. This 
effort is already bringing together like-minded faculty 
and students from political sciences, microbiology, 
engineering, veterinary sciences, public health, and 
numerous other disciplines to learn and work together. 
It is allowing the Scowcroft Institute to train the next 
generation of pandemic experts and provide leadership 
for much needed transformational learning models.  
3) Provide more grant funding  
     for interdisciplinary research.
As we discussed in this section, there is bias among 
reviewers toward single-disciplinary research. This bias 
makes it difficult for important interdisciplinary projects 
to get the funding they need. Funding institutions, such 
as NSF and NIH, should encourage interdisciplinary 
research by providing grant opportunities that require 
interdisciplinary teams and projects. This would provide 
an avenue for funding interdisciplinary research, and 
it could also serve to encourage researchers who have 
previously been hesitate, to engage in cross-disciplinary, 
applied work.
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Introduction 
Antimicrobials are essential medicines for maintaining 
health, both within human and animal populations. 
Access to antimicrobials represent a major contribution 
to the continued improvements in human health, 
demonstrated in the progress made in reducing 
morbidity and mortality worldwide in line with targets 
identified in the Millennium Development Goals. Prior 
to the invention and introduction of antimicrobials, 
and especially antibiotics, an infection from a small cut 
could potentially have deadly consequences. In present 
times, most common infections can be combated and 
cured through a typical course of antibiotics, antivirals, 
or antifungals. Resistance to antimicrobials, however, 
is becoming increasingly common across the globe 
and thus the international community is now grappling 
with the question of how to collectively combat the 
emergence and spread of antimicrobial resistance.  
Antimicrobial resistance has already been described 
and researched in many diseases, including malaria, 
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), 
and influenza. Antibiotic resistance in particular has 
become a major concern worldwide, and as such there 
are many recommended implementations to combat its 
spread, including surveillance, prevention, and antibiotic 
stewardship. From gonorrhea to tuberculosis, antibiotic 
resistance threatens the health security of every nation 
and any person. In the past decade, the public health 
priority of antimicrobial resistance has quickly risen, and 
is now well accepted as one of the biggest threats to the 
health of populations in every corner of the world.
Due to our incredibly interconnected world, it is our 
reality that someone from anywhere can travel to the 
United States (US) with a resistant bug and transmit it. 
The direct impacts of antimicrobial resistance on health 
TAKING ON ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE
Authors: Linda Venczel, Josh Klett, and Maria Soc
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are severe, with increased morbidity and mortality 
in countries of all income levels. When the ability to 
effectively treat disease is diminished, patients are 
expected to have extended illness and complications 
resulting in more costly treatments.
Antimicrobial drugs are at the very heart of modern 
medicine. Antibiotics allow for both preventative and 
curative medicine, including surgeries, chemotherapies, 
and a wide range of common and serious bacterial 
infections. As antimicrobial resistance continues to 
worsen and spread around the world, the core of global 
health security is threatened. As a multifaceted issue, 
there is no quick fix to curb antimicrobial resistance, but 
interventions can help. Increased vaccination coverage, 
improved surveillance, and antibiotic stewardship in both 
the human and animal health sectors can contribute 
significantly to reducing the threat of antimicrobial 
resistance.  
The One Health Perspective
The challenges faced in combating antimicrobial 
resistance are multi-faceted and multi-sectoral. To 
control antimicrobial resistance, interventions must take 
a holistic, one health approach. The use of antibiotics 
as prophylaxes in animals contributes to growing 
antimicrobial resistance in agriculture, the environment, 
and humans. If only one part of the cycle is addressed, 
the other two will falter. The importance of antibiotic 
stewardship, therefore, is equally prudent in all sectors. 
Policies that restrict the use of antibiotics in animals for 
growth or preventative purposes are just as important as 
policies that promote stewardship in humans.
PATH is a member of the Northwest Antimicrobial 
Resistance Coalition. Established in 2017. The Coalition 
is a collection of stakeholders based in the Pacific 
Northwest whose purpose is to create and integrate 
effective interventions to stop antimicrobial resistance 
emergence and spread before it begins, both around 
the world and in the US. With a focus on One Health 
approaches, the Northwest Antimicrobial Resistance 
Coalition believes in utilizing the abilities of its members 
to track and understand the spread of antimicrobial 
resistance from international hot spots into the U.S. in 
order to provide a cohesive integrated system of global 
surveillance and support.
The Extended Spectrum Beta-Lactamase 
producing E. coli Tricycle Project
In response to the need for international, integrated 
surveillance of antimicrobial resistance, the WHO 
Advisory Group on Integrated Surveillance of 
Antimicrobial Resistance has begun to develop a project 
for international monitoring of Extended Spectrum 
Beta-Lactamase producing E. coli. Dubbed the Tricycle 
Project for its three pronged One Health approach, the 
focus is on allowing for a simple and affordable method 
of monitoring antimicrobial resistance in all WHO regions 
by focusing on a single indicator; Extended Spectrum 
Beta-Lactamase producing E. coli prevalence in the 
human, animal (food chain), and environmental sectors.
While some WHO regions have the resources to monitor 
antimicrobial resistance to a wide and thorough extent, 
this is not the case in most low- and middle-income 
countries. To have a global picture of antimicrobial 
resistance, the WHO Advisory Group on Integrated 
Surveillance of Antimicrobial Resistance underlines the 
need to monitor antimicrobial resistance in a simple, 
cost-effective, and standardized fashion. Extended 
Spectrum Beta-Lactamase producing E. coli was chosen 
as the sole indicator due to its association with severe 
morbidity and mortality as well as high associated 
health costs. It is also useful as a monitoring tool for 
antimicrobial resistance interventions, as its prevalence 
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decreases as antibiotic control increases. Though there 
are limitations to such a project, including this narrow 
scope, it is an important step forward in the facilitation 
of an international system of surveillance that can 
be implemented in countries of different wealth and 
resources.
In Senegal
Access to quality and relevant laboratory data is a 
crucial piece of health system monitoring, and especially 
so in antimicrobial resistance. PATH supported the 
Direction of Laboratories of the Ministry of Health to 
aid in building Senegal’s laboratory workforce capacity 
to detect potential public health threats and improve 
the timeliness and quality of laboratory reporting and 
surveillance of antimicrobial resistance. The Minister 
of Health in Senegal reactivated the National Antibiotic 
Stewardship Committee, which allowed for key progress 
to be made. 
In line with improving laboratory workforce capacity, 
PATH helped guide the updating of meta data in the 
District Health Information System in Senegal as well 
as conducting training on information systems data 
integration and decision making in District Health 
Information System. We first developed a system to map 
laboratories in Senegal and identified 168 functional 
medical biology laboratories (compare to estimates 
by Director of Laboratories of 125-130 labs). Data was 
collected from 135 of 168 of the registered laboratories 
and on-site supervision missions were conducted in 36 
laboratories to validate the data collected from District 
Health Information System and control for self-reporting 
errors, while other laboratories were contacted by phone 
to verify data. This monumental progress in optimizing 
health data is a leap forward in the quest to understand 
and combat the use of antibiotics and antimicrobial 
resistance.
In Vietnam
PATH continues to chair and host meetings of the 
infection prevention and control/antimicrobial resistance 
Joint Coordination Group, a consortium of international 
organizations active in infection prevention and control  
and antimicrobial resistance in Vietnam. The group 
brings together key implementing partners in Vietnam 
involved in antimicrobial resistance-related work, and 
provides opportunities for sharing information and 
improving coordination and collaboration. In Hanoi, six 
model hospitals were selected to serve as archetypes 
for infection prevention and control. As these model 
hospitals build their capacity, their example will trickle 
down to tertiary clinics in rural areas, especially in terms 
of new guidelines that are developed as a result of 
positive results in model hospitals.
By looking forward towards what else can be done at 
the community level to bolster antimicrobial resistance 
stewardship, we are positioning to develop an existing 
application that will support retail pharmacists in 
Vietnam to guide their prescribing practices and 
provide data to the Ministry of Health. By utilizing a 
user-centered approach, PATH hopes to improve data 
collection on antibiotic prescribing as well as improving 
prescribing practices through learning tools and logic 
gate decision tools.
Conclusion
The threat of antimicrobial resistance is a pressing public 
health issue that deserves the attention of the global 
health community.  If left unaddressed, antimicrobial 
resistance will continue to worsen and spread, leading 
to massive mortality and morbidity, not only in low- and 
middle-income countries, but in wealthy nations as well. 
Inappropriate antibiotic and antimicrobial use is the 
single most important contributing factor of antibiotic 
and antimicrobial resistance, but with thoughtful and 
poignant interventions, inappropriate use can be 
stopped. Communities are poised to be invaluable 
players on the world stage. By getting communities 
informed and engaged, they can be involved in 
prescribing decisions, more aware of the importance of 
(Source: PATH/Ngo Thi Than Thuy)
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infection prevention and control, and more engaged with 
governmental policies that support a healthy community 
through antimicrobial resistance control.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1) Strong national surveillance system that can  
     help detect and monitor trends and risk  
     factors for antimicrobial resistance.
Having a strong national surveillance system in place 
can help detect and monitor trends and risk factors 
for antimicrobial resistance and aid in the process 
of enhancing antibiotic stewardship. Without proper 
monitoring systems, it is not possible to track and 
understand how antimicrobial resistance emerges and 
spreads, which impedes the development of relevant 
policy and intervention in healthcare settings. The 
importance of national surveillance is relevant in all 
healthcare settings, including hospitals, outpatient 
settings, and pharmacies, especially in rural areas, in 
order to have local, regional, and national data.
Surveillance of antimicrobial resistance in animal 
populations is also a salient aspect of antimicrobial 
resistance data. Many antimicrobials used in human 
medicine are also used to treat illnesses in animal 
populations.  Previously, antimicrobials were included as 
feed supplements to intensively farmed animals in order 
to increase productivity. While this use of antimicrobials 
has declined in recent years, with many countries limiting 
the use of antimicrobials in food-producing animals, 
there are still instances of overuse especially in low- and 
middle-income countries where oversight is limited.  
Since animal populations play a key role in antimicrobial 
resistance emergence, surveillance in agriculture, 
aquaculture and veterinary practices is essential. Not 
only is it an invaluable means of tracking antimicrobial 
resistance in and of itself, it is vital for the tracking of 
policy effects on animal antimicrobial practices.
2) Proper sanitation and hand-washing limit  
     the spread of bacteria and reduce  
     infections, leading to a decrease in the need  
     for antimicrobials. 
Vaccines are a key aspect of antimicrobial resistance 
prevention, as they reduce the need for antimicrobials 
immensely. Prevention serves as a key series of 
interventions that can strongly galvanize communities to 
be a part of antimicrobial resistance reduction.
In many low-income countries, there is a lack of 
hygienic facilities and practices in healthcare settings, 
resulting in high rates of infection, and, as a result, high 
mortality, morbidity, and antimicrobial use. Proper 
water supply, sanitation, and hygiene (referred to as 
WASH) interventions can reduce the risk of infection in 
all healthcare settings as well as improving community 
engagement and trust. Coverage estimates of these 
interventions in healthcare facilities is limited, and only 
recently has data been aggregated across countries. For 
instance, Tanzania has national guidelines on proper 
water supply, sanitation, and hygiene but there are 
huge gaps in this coverage in clinics. PATH developed a 
protocol to test proper WASH interventions to reduce 
the spread of pathogens and antimicrobial resistance in 
Tanzania. This protocol was used to assess proper WASH 
coverage in 100 health care facilities in Monduli, Hai, and 
Itilima districts. The team is summarizing the findings 
from this study for publication in a peer-reviewed 
journal, but early results indicate drastically improved 
rates of hand-washing when proper water supply, 
sanitation, and hygiene interventions are executed.
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Weak Social Networks Threaten Response 
to Next Pandemic
“Recall, if you will, the promise of the Internet,” 
wrote Adam Elder in the April 2019 issue of Esquire, 
“Democracy would be upgraded, distant peoples would 
be brought together in perfect harmony, and all of 
human knowledge would be a click away. Let’s just say 
the bugs haven’t been worked out quite yet.” Indeed, 
the world has changed a lot since the 1918 influenza 
pandemic and the 1957 Hong Kong Flu pandemic and 
most of this change has been for the better. Not just the 
Internet, but much of the technology and innovation 
over the past decades has driven vast improvements in 
people’s lives. Fewer people live in extreme poverty, go 
to bed hungry, or die of preventable diseases than at any 
time in human history.
Specialization and continuous improvement—doing 
what you are good at and working to constantly get 
better at it — drove the majority of those improvements 
and continues to upgrade lifestyles while decreasing 
costs. The twin forces of the Walmart Effect (Fishman, 
2006) and Moore’s Law continuously drive down costs, 
improve quality, and increase connectivity. Amazon will 
deliver almost anything overnight and the previously 
disconnected and unorganized can create social 
movements, like Occupy Wall Street, Black Lives Matter, 
and the Gilet Jaunes.
But, specialization has also led to increasing silos with an 
increasing number of people focusing on narrower and 
narrower fields and talking less and less across sectors. 
And, perhaps more importantly, trust has plummeted. 
“We are living in an era of backlash against authority,” 
according to Matthew Harrington (2017), “For 17 years 
the Edelman Trust Barometer has surveyed tens of 
thousands of people across dozens of countries about 
their levels of trust in business, media, government, and 
NGOs. This year [2017] was the first time the study found 
TOPIC AREA 4: MULTI-SECTORAL COLLABORATION 
Author: Richard Crespin
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a decline in trust across all four of these institutions. In 
almost two-thirds of the 28 countries we surveyed, the 
general population did not trust the four institutions to 
‘do what is right...’”
The next pandemic will require a “whole of society” 
response across entire communities. When no 
community is spared, each individual community 
will need to marshal its own response. Yet, with trust 
at all-time lows and community bonds frayed, local 
communities around the world may find themselves 
particularly vulnerable. In Bowling Alone, author 
Robert Putnam described the decline of civic society. 
The social clubs and organizations that used to bind 
local communities together have experienced falling 
membership and participation for decades. These basic 
bonds—the ability to know and trust your neighbor, your 
local authorities, and your local institutions—have frayed 
and may leave many of us afraid and alone come the 
next pandemic.
Couple this with ever increasing specialization and the 
trouble only mounts. While fewer people stay in the 
same job for their whole careers, most still stick to a 
single career field or sector. Complex challenges, like 
responding to pandemics, however, will require people 
who have insider knowledge of the bureaucracies, 
motivations, and functions of the public, private, and 
civil sector organizations that will lead the response. 
“Yet as the tri-sector leaders needed to address such 
challenges are becoming more valuable, they are also 
becoming harder to develop — particularly in the United 
States, owing to a widening disparity between business, 
government, and nonprofit incomes; the onerous 
confirmation process for senior government jobs, and 
the differing incentives and cultures of the three sectors” 
(Lovegrove & Thomas, 2013).
Now is the time to rethink preparation plans and to go 
beyond first responders and healthcare professionals. 
Now is the time to engage governments at all levels, 
particularly the local level, and to create purposeful and 
pre-positioned agreements on response that bridge 
these divides.
In the wake of Hurricane Harvey, organizations from 
across the United States came to the aid of Houston. The 
cavalry rode to the rescue. For pandemics on the scale of 
the 1918 Spanish Flu or the 1957 Hong Kong Flu, however, 
capitals like Washington, DC or Brussels will have limited 
capacity to aid distant provinces, able only to deal with 
their own sick and dying. The cavalry won’t ride to the 
rescue.
Instead, communities need to prepare to respond alone. 
A 2018 modeling exercise for the insurance industry 
concluded that the annual risk of an outbreak on the 
scale of 1918 lies between 0.5% and 1.0% (Madhav et 
al., 2018). While that might seem low, “[p]andemics 
know no boundaries. That is especially true now, when 
factors such as international travel, climate change, 
deforestation, and human-animal interactions are all 
accelerating the spread of infectious diseases.”
Increasing numbers of us live in cities without knowing 
our neighbors or belonging to religious or civic 
organizations. We know people within our own career 
fields or the parents of our children’s friends, but few of 
us know our local government officials, local business 
owners, or first responders on a first name basis. What 
will happen when the next pandemic inevitably strikes? 
Will we be prepared and will our communities rebound?
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Consider this: companies produce much of our food, 
clothing, technology, transportation, and many of the 
things that make up our modern lives. More people 
interact with, work for, or live near businesses than 
almost any other institution in modern society. The local 
Starbucks, to take one example, often stands in for the 
community “living room” where people of all classes 
intermingle. Companies like these are often well placed 
to play critical roles in times of disaster, including the 
outbreak of epidemics and pandemics. Governments 
at all levels need to think about how they could work 
now with businesses, civic organizations, faith-based 
organizations, and other nongovernmental organizations 
to put in place plans for how they will work together 
before the inevitable occurs. Below we lay out six 
recommendations for encouraging greater multi-sector 
collaboration to prepare for pandemics or large scale 
epidemics.
Conclusions
Acting on the recommendations provided below will 
require leaders at all levels and from multiple disciplines 
and sectors to think more broadly about their roles in 
society. Specifically, those involved in pandemic and 
disaster response can broaden their circle of inclusion. 
Think about how you might formally and informally 
build the kinds of relationships or create the kinds 
of convening opportunities outlined above. Business 
leaders can accept invitations from governments and 
nonprofits to participate in pandemic preparedness.
Perhaps most importantly, we should all consider how 
we might build relationships that create more resilient 
communities now. The world has changed a lot since the 
last pandemic and we do have many more tools, gadgets, 
networks, and innovations at our disposal. It will take 
deliberate planning and action now, though, to ensure 
we can actually use them when the time comes. By 
acting now we can make sure we are strong and united 
ready to face down the crises to come.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1) Establish multi-sectoral relationships.
The level of trust and understanding between and 
among government agencies, healthcare NGOs, and the 
private sector remains low. Additionally, many in the 
scientific and medical fields, responsible for pandemic 
Mass Population Trust Gap
76
69
69
68
66
60
58
54
54
54
52
51
47
46
46
45
44
44
43
42
41
41
41
40
39
37
28
12
 14
15
15
 17
9
12
 20
14
13
14
5
13
13
7
8
9
 17
8
 18
18
7
12
 24
8
16
7
*
*
*
*
*
*
14
China
Indonesia
Saudi Arabia
UAE
India
Singapore
Malaysia
Canada
Mexico
The Netherlands
Hong Kong
Colombia
U.S.
Australia
Italy
Argentina
S. Africa
S. Korea
Brazil
Germany
France
Ireland
Turkey
U.K.
Spain
Japan
Russia
50 Global
*highest-ever trust inequality 
Distrust (<50)Trust (>59) Neutral (50-59)
Informed Public
88
84
83
83
83
74
70
69
68
67
66
64
61
60
60
59
59
56
53
53
53
53
53
51
48
47
35
China
Saudi Arabia
India
Indonesia
UAE
Canada
Malaysia
Singapore
Mexico
The Netherlands
Hong Kong
U.K.
S. Korea
Germany
U.S.
Australia
France
Colombia
Argentina
Italy
Japan
S. Africa
Turkey
Brazil
Ireland
Spain
Russia
64 Global
A WORLD  OUT OF BALANCE
Trust Index 2019
FIG. 
03
TRUST INEQUALITY RETURNS TO RECORD HIGHS
Trust Index (23-market average)
FIG. 
04
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
54
45
48
47 47
49
46 47
49
58
57
56
6262
60
65
9pt Gap 
16pt Gap 
16pt Gap 
Previous high
Informed  
Public
Mass
Population
Distrust (<50)Trust (>59) Neutral (50-59)
5
2
0
19
  E
d
e
lm
an
 T
ru
st B
aro
m
e
te
rFrom the 2019 Edelman Trust Barometer Executive Summary (Source: edelman.com/trust-barometer)
40
Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs
Community Resilience, Centralized Leadership & Multi-Sectoral
response, rarely work with individuals outside their field. 
Yet major breakthroughs and innovations most often 
come from the intersection of multiple disciplines. Thus, 
we need to make it easier for people outside these fields 
to share their ideas before disaster strikes.
People outside the business world often think of the 
private sector as a monolith; that all companies act 
the same. This inhibits effective engagement. If a 
government or NGO wants to “engage the private sector,” 
they must think about how to engage specific companies, 
departments, units, and people within those companies. 
This requires developing an intimate understanding of 
their motivations, priorities, and business strategies. 
Not all companies are created equal nor will they all be 
equally interested or well-placed to assist in times of 
crisis. This deeper understanding of the players within 
the private sector also includes meeting them where 
they are. It requires going to them — meeting with them 
at their conferences and other gathering points and 
coming armed with specific requests.
If you’re a leader in local government (mayor, city 
manager, state agency head), academic and research 
institution leader (deans of medical schools, heads 
of academic research departments), and/or a local 
business leader (chamber presidents, plant and 
worksite executives) consider how you might create 
informal connections and discussions with people from 
sectors different than your own around disaster — and 
specifically pandemic — preparedness, response, and 
recovery.
Again, keep in mind that big breakthroughs most often 
occur at the intersection of multiple disciplines. So, if 
you want to systematically encourage breakthroughs for 
pandemic response, governments and donors should 
fund the intermingling of disciplines. This could take the 
form of encouraging more:
• Multi-disciplinary programs and courses in 
universities, e.g., public policy and epidemiology or 
communications and health
• Mashups at conferences or events that bring 
together diverse disciplines. Examples might include 
hosting mashups with:
• Fashion designers to redesign clothing and 
equipment (not for “fashion” but for greater 
comfort and function)
• Media and advertising professionals on 
communications in a crisis or on behavior change 
communications
• Retailers to redesign healthcare facilities for 
greater speed/convenience of service
Remember that companies make their money by 
specializing — by being the very best at a very small 
set of things. People within those companies are rarely 
encouraged to think big thoughts about existential 
questions, like what to do in a pandemic. They need 
permission to focus their attention on these kinds of 
issues. Donors and government agencies, through their 
brands and convening power can focus the minds and 
attention of key staff on these vital issues. They can 
use that power to engage companies to participate in 
simulations, exercises, and other events that would 
create the basis for collaboration before a crisis hits (see 
below).
Donors and governments should also use their 
convening power to create greater levels of trust. 
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The very best way to create trust — in fact the most 
fundamental way — is through the act of breaking bread 
together. Well-intentioned rules that limit the ability of 
some actors to pay for meals and alcoholic beverages 
restrict the ability to build trust. Donors and other actors 
should work together to modify and/or comply with 
ethics rules while creating environments that will actually 
build trust.
Lastly, if and when you do meet with business leaders, 
come armed with specific requests that go beyond 
donations or corporate social responsibility. Tap into 
companies’ supply chains, talent, skilled volunteers, and 
other assets.
2) Pre-position agreements, simulations,  
     and practice.
Similar to the agreements and advanced planning 
established for natural disaster response and recovery 
among some governments and key companies, relevant 
agencies and NGOs should establish cooperation 
agreements and conduct joint exercises and simulations 
to build up the muscle memory among key actors for 
pandemic response. This should include:
• Pharmaceutical, medical supply, and medical 
technology companies, and their supply chain 
partners
• Transportation, logistics, and supply chain 
management companies
• Telecommunications (especially mobile) and utilities
• Media (for assistance in public messaging and 
managing panic)
• Retailers, food service, distributors, lodging, 
hospitality, and other firms with “last mile” footprints
Simulations/exercises should include representatives 
of all of the above along with representatives from 
relevant agencies from the national, regional, and local 
governments, legislative staff, faith-based organizations, 
local charities, and donors.
3) Create open meta-data standards  
     and require their use.
After the last Ebola crisis, we helped lead an after-action 
review among healthcare information systems providers. 
That review revealed that many healthcare providers 
and health ministries struggled to track patients through 
the hastily organized system of care. Ministries within 
a single country — much less across multiple countries 
— couldn’t effectively share data about patients. Did a 
mobile trailer “count” as a health clinic? How could the 
ministry of tourism share information about a traveler 
with the ministry of health when they didn’t have 
common data dictionaries?
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While remaining cognizant of data privacy needs 
and intellectual property protections, donors and 
governments should consider how to make it easier to 
appropriately share data across healthcare information 
systems. Creating a common personal identifier or at 
least a common meta-data tag for a person, a facility, 
and other common data dictionary terms would 
dramatically improve response in a pandemic. Donors 
and governments should support the creation and 
require the use of open/standard APIs (application 
programming interfaces), and the use of the common 
data dictionary and data standards mentioned above. 
They should also require that implementers and relevant 
agencies have pre-negotiated plans for how to share 
data in times of emergency — including data that would 
normally be subject to data privacy restrictions.
4) Create effective chains of communication.
Especially in democratic societies, effective 
collaboration, even in times of crisis, requires less 
command-and-control and more communicate-
and-coordinate. Therefore, either as part of the pre-
positioned agreements or in the absence of them, local 
communities should be encouraged to create clear 
chains of communication and coordination. These should 
map the various stakeholders and key actors, outline 
criteria for when to engage them (e.g., by defining what 
constitutes a crisis), prescribe mobilization plans, and set 
forth communication and coordination protocols. These 
could be as simple as “call trees” that indicate who to 
call about what and when, all the way to more advanced 
scenario-based plans.
5) Be prepared to counter fake news 
     and fake science.
Public trust in institutions is at an all-time low. Media 
and “official” sources of information are increasingly 
fractured and distributed. We have never faced a major 
global crisis in the social media era. It is therefore 
increasingly likely that in societies of all sizes and levels 
of development that large swaths of the population 
will distrust official news, information, and science. 
This will lead to delays and even active obstruction 
of coordination and response. Responsible agencies 
should actively engage with digital and traditional 
media companies and personalities, key influencers 
(e.g., celebrities, religious and traditional leaders, 
teachers, etc.), as well as communications professionals, 
academics, and researchers to understand and plan for 
how pandemics might play out in the modern media 
landscape.
6) Avoid the high cost of free.
Past experience has shown that disasters attract 
large sums of money. In the immediate aftermath of 
a disaster, this kind of philanthropy can be immensely 
helpful in dealing with humanitarian needs. But, as 
communities start to recover, “free” can begin to work 
against the long-term recovery of markets and the 
business community. Therefore, local authorities should 
encourage a rapid return to commerce in the aftermath 
of a pandemic encouraging people to buy products 
and services in the impacted areas to ensure these 
businesses and economies recover.
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The Scowcroft Institute Annual Pandemic Policy Summit 
is held every fall at Texas A&M University in College 
Station, Texas. The 5th Annual Summit will be held 
November 11–12, 2019.
The Summit brings together political leaders, 
researchers, practitioners, and the private sector 
to discuss issues in pandemic preparedness and 
biosecurity. Participants come from diverse backgrounds 
including biodefense response organizations, U.S. 
Government institutions, multilateral and non-
governmental organizations, private sector partners, 
host countries, foundations, think tanks, and institutions 
critical for improved pandemic response, biodefense, 
and health security.
The first day of the Summit takes place under Chatham 
House Rule to allow keynotes and panelists to speak 
openly about challenges surrounding pandemic 
preparedness and biosecurity. The second day of 
the Summit is open to the public and provides an 
opportunity for the broader community to learn from 
some of the world’s leading experts in this field. 
At the end of every Summit, a white paper is produced 
that details the major issues of debate and provides 
recommendations for closing some of the remaining 
gaps.  
ANNUAL PANDEMIC POLICY  SUMMIT
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“We live in an era of tremendous global change. Policy makers will confront unfamiliar 
challenges, new opportunities, and difficult choices in the years ahead. I look forward 
to the Scowcroft Institute supporting policy-relevant research that will contribute to our 
understanding of these changes, illuminating their implications for our national interest, 
and fostering lively exchanges about how the United States can help shape a world that 
best serves our interests and reflects our values.”
— Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, USAF (Ret.)
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